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LAWYERING FOR GROUPS:  
THE CASE OF AMERICAN INDIAN 
TRIBAL ATTORNEYS 
Kristen A. Carpenter* & Eli Wald** 
 
Lawyering for groups, broadly defined as the legal representation of a 
client who is not an individual, is a significant and booming phenomenon.  
Encompassing the representation of governments, corporations, 
institutions, peoples, classes, communities, and causes, lawyering for 
groups is what many, if not most, lawyers do.  And yet, the dominant theory 
of law practice—the Standard Conception, with its principles of zealous 
advocacy, nonaccountability, and professional role-based morality—and 
the rules of professional conduct that codify it, continue to be premised on 
the basic antiquated assumption that the paradigmatic client-attorney 
relationship is between an individual client and an individual attorney.  The 
result is a set of rules and a theory of law practice that often ill fit the 
practice of group lawyers. 
This Article explores the theoretical and practical challenges of group 
lawyering through the study of lawyers for American Indian tribes.  We 
believe that a focus on tribal lawyers furthers two important goals.  First, 
the individualistic impulse of the dominant theory of law practice is so 
ingrained that it forecloses the possibility of challenging and imagining 
genuine group-based alternatives.  In order to truly see the shortcomings of 
the Standard Conception and conceive of alternatives to it, one must start 
not with an abstract theory of group representation, but with a detailed 
study of the meaning, needs, interests, and realities of actual groups and 
build a corresponding theory from the ground up.  Second, the story of 
tribal lawyers, an important narrative of both the legal profession and of 
tribes, is still largely untold.  This Article thus aims to challenge the 
homogeneity of the Standard Conception of law practice and to begin the 
process of imagining group-based alternatives to it, while at the same time 
telling part of the story of tribal lawyers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Today’s scholars of the legal profession are asking profound questions 
about what changes in the practice of law mean for global governance, 
including issues of corporate power, state sovereignty, and human rights.1  
This conversation necessarily entails consideration of the many forms of 
client organization, and indeed human association, comprising our 
profession and society.  And, yet, the conversation is stymied by the 
absence of theoretical and descriptive accounts capturing the phenomenon 
of lawyering for groups.  Instead, the professional obligations of lawyers 
remain largely conscripted to a model of individual lawyering, envisioning 
a lawyer representing a singular person or entity in litigation, that fails to 
 
 1. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins & Mihaela Papa, The Rise of the Corporate Legal Elite 
in the BRICS:  Implications for Global Governance 36 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 1–3). 
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account for developments in the practice of law.2  This gap in the 
scholarship, in turn, reflects insufficient treatment of group lawyering in the 
rules regulating the profession. 
In this Article, we explore the challenges of group lawyering through the 
study of lawyers for American Indian tribes—groups that have, for 
hundreds of years, engaged lawyers in their multifaceted, intergenerational 
struggles to survive the forces of conquest and colonization.  Today, there 
are 566 federally recognized Indian tribes, most of which engage lawyers as 
advocates in their quest for political self-determination, cultural and 
religious freedom, and socioeconomic well-being.3  Indian tribes share 
some common characteristics with other groups and entities, namely that 
they are collective associations of individuals often united by history, 
kinship, language, and culture, and bound together by social, economic, and 
political concerns.  On the other hand, as we describe below, tribes are also 
different from many groups in the United States in that they are recognized 
as sovereigns, with reserved rights of governance over their territories and 
citizens.4  Despite the extensive and rich experiences of the lawyers who 
represent tribes, these stories have for the most part escaped notice in the 
professional responsibility literature. 
We believe that a focus on tribal lawyers furthers two important goals.  
First, the individualistic impulse of the basic model of law practice and its 
emerging alternatives is so ingrained that it forecloses the possibility of 
challenging and imagining genuine group-based alternatives.  In order to 
truly see the shortcomings of the basic model and conceive of alternatives 
to it, one must start not with an abstract theory of group representation, but 
with a detailed study of the meaning, needs, interests, and realities of actual 
groups and build a corresponding theory from the ground up.  Second, the 
story of tribal lawyers, an important narrative of both the legal profession 
and of tribes, is still largely untold.  This Article thus aims to challenge the 
homogeneity of the standard conception of law practice and to begin the 
 
 2. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1281 (1976) (describing the (then) relatively new phenomenon of lawyering for 
groups). 
 3. For background on American Indian tribes and their contemporary situations, see 
ROBERT T. ANDERSON, BETHANY BERGER, PHILIP P. FRICKEY & SARAH KRAKOFF, AMERICAN 
INDIAN LAW:  CASES AND COMMENTARY, 1–13 (2008).  Like this and other sources, our 
Article uses the terms “American Indian” and “Native American” interchangeably. 
 4. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 4.01 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 
2005).  Beyond the foundational concept of Indian tribes as political sovereigns within the 
U.S. legal system, there is a great deal of scholarship considering various legal, political, 
sociological, racial, cultural, and religious aspects of Indian tribes vis-à-vis other groups. 
While we cannot replicate these arguments here, we refer the reader to the following articles 
and sources cited therein. See Kristen A. Carpenter, Real Property and Peoplehood, 
27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 313, 344–63 (2008) (drawing from political, sociological, and legal 
theory on groups, associations, and political entities to describe American Indian tribes as 
“peoples” entitled to treatment as such in litigation about property and religion); Angela R. 
Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L. REV. 799, 807–38 (2007) (situating 
the “sovereign” status of tribes within domestic and international literature on minority 
groups and human rights). 
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process of imagining group-based alternatives to it, while at the same time 
telling part of the story of tribal lawyers. 
We should be clear at the outset that the story we tell is neither 
exhaustive nor general; each of the several hundred tribes has its own 
experience, culture, and objectives in legal representation, which we can 
only begin to evoke here.  Moreover, we do not wish to overstate the role of 
lawyers in the historic survival or contemporary revitalization of Indian 
tribes, much of which is attributable to the resilience of tribal members and 
lifeways rather than the law or legal profession.  Nevertheless, there are 
lessons to draw from our analysis of tribal lawyering, and they are broader 
than simply identifying a list of potential revisions to particular rules—for 
example, to include references to cultural literacy as an aspect of attorney 
competence (though that would be a good start).  Rather, we argue that the 
story of tribal lawyers reveals an overarching need to create space for 
competing diverse visions and professional ideologies to emerge alongside 
the dominant ideology of the standard conception—ideologies that will in 
turn inform and shape the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the 
role of lawyers for both groups and individuals. 
Finally, to the extent that American individualism, as a broad-based 
social and cultural phenomenon, is the cause of lawyers’ rules of conduct 
and professional ideologies, revising the rules and rethinking the ideology 
that informs them may accomplish little.  Similarly, to the extent that the 
subordination of American Indians reflects deep historical, political, racial, 
and economic factors, any changes to the legal profession may promise 
only modest remedial effect.  We believe, however, that professional rules 
and roles not only reflect but also shape and inform the conduct of 
American lawyers and that challenging the dominant standard conception 
may result in more effective and empowering lawyering for groups, 
including Indian tribes. 
In Part I, we describe the “Standard Conception,” the dominant 
professional ideology that undergirds the American Bar Association’s 
(ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct, as based on a model of 
individual lawyering that fails to reflect the challenges of lawyering for 
groups, and further explain why the example of tribal lawyering is an 
illuminating example.  In Part II, we provide a short history of American 
Indian tribal lawyering, situating the role of the contemporary tribal 
attorney against the history of American Indian experiences in the legal 
system and analyzing a rich set of examples from the American Indian Law 
literature describing and theorizing the role of the tribal attorney.  In Part 
III, we explore how the basic features of the Standard Conception—that is, 
zealous advocacy, nonaccountability, and professional role-based 
morality—as well as specific rules of conduct that codify it sometimes fit 
poorly with the representation of Indian tribes and other groups.  In Part IV, 
we synthesize the lessons learned from our study of tribal lawyers and the 
legal profession and compare and contrast them with the experiences of 
other lawyers for groups, including government, public interest, 
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community, and class action attorneys.  Our analysis generalizes some of 
the lessons from tribal lawyering and other instances of lawyering for 
groups to expose the limitations of the Standard Conception and the rules of 
professional conduct.  Finally, we identify and describe new professional 
rules and statements emerging from Indian Country, suggesting that these 
models begin to contemplate aspects of effective representation, client 
empowerment, and personal identity as they inform tribal representation 
and may enlighten the practice of group lawyers more broadly. 
I.  LAWYERING FOR GROUPS:  A PRACTICE IN SEARCH OF A THEORY 
Historically, the practice of law involved an individual client represented 
by an individual attorney.5  And while practice realities have evolved—
clients now include corporations, communities, governments, and causes; 
lawyers include law firms of all sizes and sorts; and representation includes 
litigation, negotiation, mediation, lobbying, and other activities—the theory 
of law practice and the regulation of lawyers have been slow to catch up.  
Theories of law practice and lawyers’ professional identity by and large 
assume and address the role of individual lawyers.  And the regulation of 
lawyers, notably the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules) 
and the state rules based on them, continue to, if only implicitly, assume 
and regulate individual lawyers, representing individual clients in 
litigation.6 
Within this framework, the dominant theory of law practice is the 
Standard Conception, a role-morality theory based on the twin principles of 
zealous advocacy and lawyers’ nonaccountability for the goals they help 
clients bring about.  The Standard Conception treats individual lawyers as 
the focus of inquiry, has little to nothing to say about law firms, and 
assumes, often implicitly, individual clients.  The leading critics of the 
Standard Conception, both those who accept role morality and argue about 
the details of its guiding principles and those who reject role morality in 
favor of common morality, all similarly assume the lawyer and client to be 
individuals.7 
It is therefore not surprising that the vast majority of the Rules that 
implement and give life to the Standard Conception purport to regulate the 
conduct of individual lawyers assumed to be serving individual clients.  The 
sole exception when it comes to lawyering for groups is Rule 1.13, titled 
Organization As Client, providing:  “A lawyer employed or retained by an 
organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized 
constituents.”8  Rule 1.13 then addresses substantive and structural aspects 
 
 5. See generally David B. Wilkins, Everyday Practice Is the Troubling Case:  
Confronting Context in Legal Ethics, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 68 
(Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. 
REV. 468 (1990). 
 6. See infra Part III.C. 
 7. See infra Part III.A. 
 8. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2012). 
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of representing organizational clients, which largely involve ascertaining 
the “best interests” of the organization and observing the chain of 
“authority” in communications with officers.9  In these and other ways, the 
Rule reduces the multiplicity of persons and interests potentially involved 
in organizational representation into a single “legal entity” model.10  Put 
differently, Rule 1.13, the only Rule that purports to deal with clients who 
are not individuals, largely likens organizations to individuals for purposes 
of articulating the lawyer’s professional obligations. 
There is, of course, legal precedent for treating organizational clients like 
individuals.  The U.S. Supreme Court long ago held that corporations are 
legal persons11 and, as a practical matter, it is helpful for lawyers to be able 
to rely on corporate hierarchies (such as the authority of the chief executive 
officer) and norms (like the business judgment rule) to shape their 
representation of clients who observe them.12  Yet deeming corporations 
legal persons such that they can enter into binding legal contracts, sue, and 
be sued is very different than assuming either that corporations are legal 
persons for all purposes or that groups of people are akin to corporate 
entities.  As scholars have begun to discuss, some client groups, such as 
governments, communities, and causes, are not organizations in the 
corporate sense, and representing them requires a more nuanced approach 
than merely treating them as such.13  These and other groups raise major 
questions for legal representation—including the challenges of determining 
the group’s objectives, ascertaining who speaks for the group, and 
addressing divergent constituencies within it—that remain largely 
unaddressed by the rules pertaining to individual clients. 
As the legal profession continues to grow, some scholars have criticized 
the “one-size-fits-all” Standard Conception and regulatory approach 
adhered to by the organized bar and its leaders.  With so many lawyers 
doing so many different things, it is hard to see how the myth of the “One 
Bar” can be sustained.  Any professional ideology and rules of professional 
conduct purporting to suit everybody may end up being a poor fit for many, 
and a more contextual framework may be needed.  Our claim, however, is a 
related but slightly different one.  We argue that not only are the Standard 
Conception and the Rules that built on it—with their core commitments to 
individualism, autonomy, and the pursuit of self-interest—sometimes a 
poor fit for group lawyers, but that they also tend to obscure, if not 
 
 9. Id. R. 1.13(b). 
 10. Id. R. 1.13 cmt. 1 (defining an organizational client broadly as “a legal entity”). 
 11. See Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. Ry. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886); Trs. of Dartmouth 
Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819). 
 12. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005). 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
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altogether preempt, important questions about the rule of law and the role 
lawyers play in contemporary society.14 
To explore and substantiate our argument about the need for a theory of 
group lawyering, we turn to the context of tribal lawyers.  By the term 
“tribal lawyers,” we mean lawyers for Indian tribes, and particularly for the 
hundreds of federally recognized tribes that maintain a political relationship 
with the United States.  We do not focus on lawyers for individual Indians, 
Indian-owned businesses, or tribal judges except to the extent they are 
implicated by the question of tribal lawyering.  The historical, cultural, and 
political contexts in which tribes engage lawyers reveal the limitations of a 
model of professional responsibility that treats groups as faceless 
individuals, without any particularized consideration of the group’s internal 
structure or values, its relationship with the society around it, or its 
aspirations for the future.  As we describe below, some of the issues raised 
by tribal lawyering are specific to American Indian experiences and others 
are illuminating to broader questions of lawyering for groups. 
American Indian tribes had, by the time Europeans arrived in the “new 
world,” already been living according to their own traditional laws and 
cultural norms for thousands of years.  Tribal leaders, who traditionally 
performed internal dispute resolution and external diplomacy functions, 
found themselves on the front lines in treaty negotiations with European 
nations in the seventeenth century.  Some of tribes’ first experiences with 
Anglo-American lawyers came in mid-nineteenth century litigation over 
treaty rights, with mixed results.15  Since the 1800s, Indian tribes have been 
hiring lawyers to represent them in matters local, national, and 
international, wherein the tribe is nearly always, in one way or another, 
fighting for its survival in a difficult legal landscape.  Today, tribal 
governments, particularly through their executive and legislative branches, 
engage lawyers to represent the tribe on a variety of matters, from litigation 
and business dealings with third parties, to internal legal reform and 
institution building.  Tribes have formed offices of in-house counsel16 and 
attorneys general, whose responsibilities may be enumerated in the tribal 
 
 14. For an evocative theoretical discussion of the role of lawyers in promoting 
democracy, see, for example, Aziz Rana, Statesman or Scribe:  Legal Independence and the 
Problem of Democratic Citizenship, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1665 (2009). 
 15. See generally MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, THE EAGLE RETURNS:  THE LEGAL HISTORY 
OF THE GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA AND CHIPPEWA INDIANS 13–55 (2012) 
(describing the role of traditional leaders or ogemuk in certain Anishinabe societies); ROBERT 
A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER:  AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY VISIONS OF LAW 
AND PEACE, 1600–1800 (1997) (describing the early treaty experiences of Haudensaunee, 
Delaware, Shawnee, Fox, Cherokee, Creek, and other tribes). 
 16. See, e.g., The Tulalip Tribes of Washington Office of Reservation Attorney, TULALIP 
TRIBES, http://www.tulaliptribes-nsn.gov/Home/Government/Departments/LegalReservation
Attorney.aspx (last visited Apr. 19, 2013) (“The mission of the Office of Reservation 
Attorney is to support, defend and advance the interests of the Tulalip Tribes of Washington 
by providing quality legal services to tribal policy makers and staff.”). 
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constitution or legislative code.17  When it comes to standards of 
representation, many tribes have adopted their own rules of professional 
responsibility dictating that tribal lawyers should serve their clients much as 
any other lawyer would in the organizational model of Rule 1.13.18 
As Judge William Canby has succinctly explained, today’s tribal attorney 
is “often a major influence on tribal affairs.”19  It is against this backdrop 
that we pose the question of whether the Rules’ approach of analogizing 
tribes to individual clients based on the Standard Conception theory of law 
practice, is a sensible one.  Many tribal rules of professional responsibility 
borrow from the ABA’s Model Rules, and for the most part they initially 
seem to work relatively well in guiding lawyers who represent tribes.20  
And yet complex challenges of culture, history, constituency, agency, 
representation, and identity arise.  First, the very understanding of the role 
of the lawyer as zealous advocate in an adversarial system may be culturally 
and politically antithetical to tribal societies in which the operative norms 
favor the collective well-being of the group and values such as harmony and 
balance.  Furthermore, the assumption that the client seeks to pursue its 
autonomy and advance its goals in an adversarial fashion to the exclusion of 
others does not always reflect tribal objectives. 
Second, as described in greater detail below, any legal representation of 
American Indian tribes confronts the weight of history in which law has 
often been used to legitimize egregious moments of European conquest and 
American colonization—such as the dispossession of Indian lands, 
relocation of Indian people, and destruction of Indian religions and 
 
 17. See, e.g., AG Opinions, CHEROKEE NATION, http://ag.cherokee.org/Opinions.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2013) (“Article VII, Section 13, of the Cherokee Nation Constitution 
states:  There shall be created an office of the Attorney General.  The Attorney General shall 
be a citizen of the Cherokee Nation, admitted to practice law before the highest court of any 
state of the United States.  The Attorney General shall represent the Nation in all criminal 
cases in the courts of the Nation, and in all civil actions wherein the Cherokee Nation is 
named as a party, and shall have such other duties as the Council may prescribe by law.  The 
Attorney General shall be appointed by the Principal Chief and confirmed by the Council for 
a term of five (5) years.  The Attorney General shall be authorized to designate such 
prosecutors and other assistants as deemed necessary to carry out the duties of office, and 
may only be removed from office in conformance with Article XI of the Cherokee Nation 
Constitution.”). 
 18. See, e.g., Rob Roy Smith, The Council’s Counsel:  The Ethics of Representing Tribal 
Councils, MORRISSET, SCHLOSSER, JOZWIAK, & SOMERVILLE (July 2006), http://www.msaj
.com/ISB%20CLE%20July2006_06.htm. 
 19. See WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 72 (2009). 
 20. Compare In re the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, A-CV-41-92 (Navajo May 
17, 1993), available at http://www.navajocourts.org/NNBARulesConduct.htm#A-CV-41-92 
(adopting ABA Model Rules with amendments, additions, and exceptions), with In re the 
Adoption of Rules for Attorneys, Application to Bar, Discipline, and Oath, No. JAT AD-99-
01 (Cherokee Jan. 29, 1999), available at http://www.cherokeecourts.org/Portals/73/
Documents/CNBA/JAT-AD-99-01.pdf (adopting the State of Oklahoma’s Rules of 
Professional Conduct as a “minimum standard” of conduct for lawyers admitted to practice 
before the Cherokee courts but noting that if there is a conflict between the Oklahoma 
courts’ interpretation of those rules and the Cherokee courts’ interpretation, “the Cherokee 
law shall prevail”). 
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culture.21  During various periods of federal Indian policy, the injection of 
Anglo-American law into tribal communities has been an explicit tool of 
government “assimilation” programs designed to eradicate tribal cultures 
and governing structures.22  For all of these reasons, the Rules’ reference to 
the lawyer as an “officer of the legal system” may render the lawyer an 
outsider or even a threat to the tribal existence and raises questions about 
the lawyer’s accountability to the client community.23 
Yet, in today’s period of tribal “self-determination,” in which tribal 
people are revitalizing and decolonizing all aspects of their governments 
and institutions, the position and responsibilities of the tribal lawyer have 
also begun to change.  Tribal lawyers are now called on to assist with not 
only treaty rights litigation but also negotiating the contours of government-
to-government relationships with states and the federal government; 
economic development and financial matters; the process of internal legal 
reform, including the revision of tribal codes and constitutions, and the 
rebuilding of tribal dispute resolution institutions; and even human rights 
advocacy in international forums.  Through these activities, which 
constitute the “decolonization” of federal Indian law and the 
“revitalization” of Indian communities, tribes are identifying the core 
competencies and values they seek in legal representation and taking the 
initiative to license and hire attorneys who meet those standards.24  At this 
transformative time, a rich understanding of the role of tribal lawyers is 
very much needed. 
In fact, many of the challenges faced by tribal lawyers in daily practice 
may not be addressed by the Rules.  Pursuant to Rule 1.13, for example, a 
tribal lawyer is expected to represent her client and, in this case, “the client 
of the tribal attorney is the entire tribe, not its individual members”25—a 
prescription that flows directly from the entity model described above.  Yet, 
tribes have multivalent goals and interrelated constituencies that may 
transcend a model based on corporate clients.  As a practical matter, for 
example, the attorney may report to the tribe’s executive or legislative 
branch, but sometimes individual tribal members may believe that the tribal 
attorney should represent them.  While this problem is often resolved by 
 
 21. See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL 
THOUGHT:  THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990). 
 22. See, e.g., JUSTIN B. RICHLAND, ARGUING WITH TRADITION:  THE LANGUAGE OF LAW 
IN HOPI TRIBAL COURT 8–21 (2008) (describing the history of federal Courts of Indian 
Offenses as instruments of federal control over Indian behavior, and challenging the legacy 
concerned with the contemporary attempt to transform these courts into tribal justice 
systems). 
 23. See CANBY, supra note 19, at 73 (“Because the tribal attorneys are often not tribal 
members or even Indians, they must to some degree be considered an outside influence 
affecting tribal self-government.”). 
 24. See, e.g., RAYMOND D. AUSTIN, NAVAJO COURTS AND NAVAJO COMMON LAW:  A 
TRADITION OF TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE 32 (2009) (describing the Navajo Nation Supreme 
Court’s authority over the Navajo Bar Association, an organization that licenses attorneys 
and lay advocates who practice law in the Navajo Nation). 
 25. See CANBY, supra note 19, at 69. 
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explanation of the client identity or referral to other counsel, sometimes it is 
more fraught.  The tribal attorney may be the only attorney located on or 
near the reservation community.  In some tribes, subgroups of tribal 
members may claim to represent the tribe in some capacity; indeed, the 
government recognized by the United States may operate alongside a 
traditional leadership structure in which clan mothers, village leaders, or 
religious priests have a role in decision making.26  Moreover, for decades, 
tribes could only hire lawyers through contracts approved by the United 
States—even in cases against the United States—creating conflicts of 
interest endemic to the relationship.  In these cases, the Rules’ simplistic 
answer to the question of “whom does the attorney represent” does not 
always provide sufficient guidance to the complicated issues faced by the 
tribal attorney. 
Thus tribal lawyers face questions about whom or what entity or 
constituencies they represent.  And these are not the only questions that 
arise in the context of tribal lawyering.  How are concepts of loyalty, 
liability, fairness, and confidentiality construed in the particular tribal 
culture?27  How should tribal lawyers balance their obligation to limit the 
tribe’s liability (for example, by defending the tribe’s inherent sovereign 
immunity) with the commercial demands of financial investors and civil 
rights claims of tribal citizens?  How should a particular tribal client’s 
interests be construed against the situation of Indian tribes across the United 
States?  How should the tribal attorney envision her role against the 
backdrop and structure of federal Indian law that makes tribes both 
extraconstitutional entities and critical players in the experiments of 
American conquest and colonialism, democracy, and pluralism?28 
While some of these questions are particular to the experience of Indian 
tribes as extraconstitutional entities maintaining indigenous cultures against 
a history of colonization, others illustrate broader tensions in group 
lawyering, in which the existing model’s individualistic approach fails to 
capture the challenges of group representation.  Scholars have long noted 
shortcomings in the model of “corporate” representation, which, following 
 
 26. See, e.g., Shenandoah v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 159 F.3d 708, 710 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(describing a challenge to the federal government’s recognition of a tribal representative 
over the objection of other community members with traditional authority); Poodry v. 
Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 877 (2d Cir. 1996) (describing traditional 
and newer forms of governance operating among Seneca communities). 
 27. See Navajo Nation v. Crockett, 7 Navajo Rptr. 237 (1996) (stating that an employee 
with a grievance should “talk things out” with supervisors before turning to external 
channels of review and coercive redress). 
 28. See generally Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public 
Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 431, 436 (2005) (“[T]he more fundamental problem [of federal 
Indian law] is that, without an interrogation of the immense normative problems of a 
constitutional system created by colonialism, the answers generated by the [Supreme] Court 
are doomed to reflect a ruthless pragmatism consistent with even the modest respect for 
tribal prerogatives that traditional federal Indian law sometimes reflected in appreciation of 
our colonial past.  At bottom, we have every right to be confused about both the internal 
incoherence of Indian law and the asymmetry between that body of doctrine and its external 
analogs.”). 
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Rule 1.13, focuses on hierarchical decision-making processes and declares a 
lawyer’s allegiance to the interests of the entity defined to be the interest of 
its shareholders only to yield in reality to the authority and interests of the 
executives who hire and fire lawyers.29 
Even more troubling, the individualistic nature of the basic model of 
lawyering casts a long shadow on emerging alternative models of group 
representation.  The model of the “government lawyer” serving a singular 
entity, for example, belies many other possible ways to envision the “client” 
of the government attorney, including (1) the public interest; (2) the 
government as a whole; (3) the branch of government in which the lawyer 
is employed (e.g., executive, legislative, or judicial); (4) the particular 
agency or department in which the lawyer works; and (5) the responsible 
officers who make decisions for the agency.30 
Similarly, “cause lawyering,” in which the group is conceived in terms of 
a particular normative position, can be challenging because it requires 
assessing the cause and ascertaining who speaks for it—moves that may or 
may not account for group dynamics and values.31  Lawyering for 
“minorities”—typically seeking civil rights for groups subordinated by race, 
gender, class, religion, sexual orientation, or other status—may struggle to 
appreciate and give voice to the varied experiences, values, identities, and 
beliefs of group members.32 
In many settings, the instruction that the lawyer must serve her client in 
the traditional model fails to answer some of the difficult questions.  
Instead, it serves to only start a conversation:  for purposes of the client-
attorney representation, who and what is the client?  What does it mean to 
represent a group of individuals, interests, and values?  What does it mean 
to be a group lawyer?  On these questions, the Rules are often silent.  
Usually, when they are, the theoretical literature exploring theories of law 
practice, professional ideology, and role morality can be of use to practicing 
lawyers in providing a context against which to assess their professional 
conduct, duties under the Rules, and role obligations as well as necessary 
guidance regarding the exercise of professional judgment.33  But to the 
extent that these theories are still grounded in the paradigm of the 
individual lawyer representing an individual client, they fail to illuminate 
 
 29. See infra Part IV.A–B. 
 30. See Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values:  Can, Should, and Will 
Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 796, 797 n.41 (2000) 
(citing Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer As Whistleblower:  Confidentiality and Government 
Lawyer, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291, 296 (1991)). 
 31. See, e.g., ALAN K. CHEN & SCOTT L. CUMMINGS, PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING:  A 
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 279–90 (2013). 
 32. See GERALD P. LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING:  ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF 
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 24 (1992) (critiquing a particular approach to cause lawyering 
as “regnant lawyering” and preferring, instead, a model of community lawyering, especially 
in low-income communities); KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE:  THE CREATION 
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER 4 (2012) (challenging the conventional view that the civil 
rights lawyers of the 1960’s represented a “unified minority group”). 
 33. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2012). 
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key questions in group lawyering, such as the many questions that confront 
lawyers for Indian tribes. 
Put differently, we argue that lawyering for groups is not only a practice 
without a theory, but to some extent, a practice not knowing it lacks a 
theory.  Indeed, we assert that in purporting to apply to all lawyers—group 
lawyers included—the dominant Standard Conception obscures the need to 
develop a theory of law practice and rules of conduct that fit lawyering for 
groups.  Ultimately then, perhaps lawyering for groups can be better 
described not as a practice without a theory, but rather as practice stuck 
with an ill-fitting yet powerful theory that would benefit from additional 
reflection, including consideration of alternatives that have begun to emerge 
both in practice and in the literature. 
II.  A SHORT HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAWYERING 
This part provides a historical overview of American Indian experiences 
with lawyers, with two aims in mind:  first, to introduce some of the 
foundational rules and structures of Indian law, and second, to highlight the 
role of lawyers in developing the field.  While this history is deep and 
broad, we do not aim to provide exhaustive treatment, but rather to 
highlight key moments with relevance for our later discussion of 
contemporary American Indian tribal lawyering. 
A.  Origins 
Traditionally, Indian tribes had leaders and representatives for internal 
and external matters.34  As Matthew Fletcher writes about early Anishinabe 
communities, each band or group of families was represented by an ogemuk 
whose authority derived from success at activities such as warfare, hunting, 
or singing, and who secured their power through service to the 
community.35  In other instances, leadership may have been inherited 
among certain lineages, societies, or families.36  In many tribes, leaders 
with skills of oratory, knowledge of tribal law, and other indicia of 
community legitimacy were charged with representing the town, village, 
 
 34. While most tribes had terms for “leader,” it is less clear that they had “lawyers.”  An 
interesting project would be to assess how various tribes describe lawyers in their own 
languages.  In the Cherokee language, the noun for “lawyer” is “ditiyohihi,” a word that is 
related to the verb “atiyohiha” or “he is arguing.”  DURBIN FEELING, CHEROKEE-ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 59, 207 (1975); see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Dibakonigowin:  Indian 
Lawyer As Abductee, 31 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 209, 209 n.1 (2006) (noting that in the 
Ojibway language “dibakonigowin” means “[j]udgment undergone or received”). 
 35. See FLETCHER, supra note 15, at 14–15 (citing Benjamin Ramirez-Shkwegnaabi, The 
Dynamics of American Indian Diplomacy in the Great Lakes Region, 27 AM. INDIAN 
CULTURE & RES. J. 53 (2003)). 
 36. See, e.g., GELYA FRANK & CAROLE GOLDBERG, DEFYING THE ODDS:  THE TULE RIVER 
TRIBE’S STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY IN THREE CENTURIES (2010) (describing that the 
leadership of the Yokuts—ancestors of the contemporary Tule River Indian Tribe—
descended from the Eagle lineage, consistent with the role of the eagle in the tribal creation 
story). 
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band, or tribe in external relations.  Leaders represented their communities 
in intertribal diplomacy, and negotiations concerning land, hunting, trade, 
war, religion, and other matters often commemorated in agreements and 
treaties among tribes.  As with religion, subsistence practices, and social 
organization, leadership in many tribes was geared toward maintaining 
relationships among community members, observing the relationship 
between human beings and the natural world, and other activities geared 
toward the collective well-being and survival of the tribe.37 
It was these traditional tribal leaders, sometimes with the assistance of 
translators, who usually represented tribes in their seventeenth to nineteenth 
century treaty negotiations with European nations, colonial governments, or 
the United States.38  And while tribes do not appear to have been formally 
represented by legal counsel in most treaty negotiations, they often 
negotiated quite successfully to retain key property and sovereignty rights, 
as well as obligations of protection from the United States.  Yet it is also 
true that the treaty process was fraught with linguistic and cultural 
misunderstandings, as well as fraud and coercive practices by federal 
agents.39  Notwithstanding these complicated origins, the resulting treaties 
were (usually) ratified by Congress, forming the basis for the legal 
relationship between tribes and the United States and becoming the 
“supreme Law of the Land.”40 
B.  Power and the Legal System 
When it came time to litigate Indian treaties in court, tribes were 
represented by counsel in cases that are also fraught with complex legacies 
and interpretations.  In the famous case of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia41 in 
1831, for example, the Cherokees engaged former U.S. Attorney General 
William Wirt to sue to enjoin Georgia from extending its laws over the 
Cherokee Nation, based on its claim that the state’s activity violated the 
Treaty of Hopewell (1785) and the Treaty of Holston (1791) between the 
 
 37. For accounts of tribal norms and cultures, see, for example, Amy Bowers & Kristen 
A. Carpenter, Challenging the Narrative of Conquest:  The Story of Lyng v. Northwest 
Indian Cemetery Protective Association, in INDIAN LAW STORIES (Carole Goldberg, Kevin 
K. Washburn, Philip P. Frickey eds., 2011) (describing the Yurok, Tolowa, and Karuk 
tribes); WILMA MANKILLER & MICHAEL WALLIS, MANKILLER:  A CHIEF AND HER PEOPLE 16–
30 (1999) (describing Cherokee origins and traditions); CHARLES WILKINSON, THE PEOPLE 
ARE DANCING AGAIN:  THE HISTORY OF THE SILETZ TRIBE OF WESTERN WASHINGTON 11–53 
(2010) (describing the Siletz tribes). 
 38. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 15, at 17–27, 44–51, 61–69 (describing the role of 
ogemuk in the Treaties of 1835 and 1855). 
 39. See, e.g., STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND:  LAW AND POWER 
ON THE FRONTIER 49–84 (2005) (discussing language and cultural differences, questions of 
authority and land value, use of liquor, forgery, and fraud as factors affecting the legitimacy 
of land sales by Indian nations to colonial governments and settlers).  For additional 
background on the federal-tribal treaty relationship, see generally VINE DELORIA JR., BEHIND 
THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES:  AN INDIAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1974). 
 40. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 41. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
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Cherokee Nation and the United States.42  The Cherokee Nation lawsuit 
occurred during a period of violence and instability when Georgia’s citizens 
were increasingly threatening Cherokee life, liberty, and property.  The 
Court dismissed Cherokee Nation for lack of original jurisdiction, on 
grounds that the Cherokee Nation was not a “foreign state” entitled to sue 
Georgia pursuant to Article III.43  In 1832, the Cherokee Nation enlisted 
Wirt to raise the treaty claims again, this time in a defense of two Christian 
missionaries who had been arrested within the boundaries of the Cherokee 
Nation by Georgia authorities.  Wirt won the second case, with Chief 
Justice Marshall holding in Worcester v. Georgia44 that, as a matter of 
federal law, including the treaties, Cherokee Nation was an independent 
territory in which the laws of the state of Georgia could have no force.45   
Despite the holding in Worcester, politics quickly intervened, with 
President Andrew Jackson, Georgia, and white citizens all refusing to bend 
to the Supreme Court’s authority.46  In 1835, the United States induced a 
faction of Cherokees, opposing the elected Principle Chief and most 
Cherokee people, to sign the Treaty of New Echota ceding all of their 
eastern lands in exchange for new lands in Indian Territory (present-day 
Oklahoma).47  The majority of Cherokees continued to resist, but after 
losing property to local militias and then being physically corralled into 
federal stockades, the Cherokees were relocated to Indian Territory via the 
Trail of Tears, a devastating experience during which 4,000 people, or 
approximately one-quarter of the population, died.48 
As the Cherokee cases begin to suggest, the relationship between Indian 
tribes and their lawyers has long implicated issues of the greatest 
magnitude.  By most accounts, the Cherokees had an excellent lawyer in 
these cases.49  Additionally, as described in greater detail below, the 
Cherokee leaders went into the litigation with their eyes wide open about 
the strategy, believing that an appeal to the courts was the best remaining 
chance of preserving the Cherokee Nation, particularly after having already 
petitioned the executive and legislative branches for relief.  Moreover, Wirt 
 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. 
 44. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Rennard Strickland, The Tribal Struggle for Sovereignty:  The Story of the 
Cherokee Cases, in INDIAN LAW STORIES, supra note 37. 
 47. See id. at 77–78. 
 48. These figures are somewhat contested, with “population lost” estimates as low as 
2,000 and as high as 10,000, depending on the methodology.  For discussion, see CHARLES 
C. ROYCE, THE CHEROKEE NATION OF INDIANS 170–78 (1975); RUSSELL THORNTON, THE 
CHEROKEES:  A POPULATION HISTORY 74 (1990). 
 49. Compare Matthew L.M. Fletcher, 2010 Dillon Lecture:  Rebooting Indian Law in 
the Supreme Court, 55 S.D. L. REV. 510, 518 (2010) (describing Wirt as “one of the most 
influential, well-known, and successful appellate advocates in the nation”), with Carey N. 
Vicenti, The Social Structures of Legal Neocolonialism in Native America, 10 KAN. J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 513, 518 (2001) (“It should be noted, though, that the Cherokee Nation relied for 
legal advice upon persons who were not members of the nation, nor sworn to any allegiance 
to the nation.”). 
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did convince the Supreme Court to strike down Georgia laws threatening 
the political autonomy of the Cherokee Nation.  From a federal common 
law perspective, Cherokee Nation and Worcester are arguably good 
precedents, establishing the status of tribes as “domestic dependent nations” 
subject to the authority and protection of the United States, with reserved 
rights of sovereignty and property.  These holdings constitute some of the 
“foundational principles” of federal Indian law, which leading scholars have 
described as protecting the tribal existence.50   
Yet, as a practical matter for the Cherokees, even the best legal advocacy 
did not protect them from horrific losses of life, homeland, and culture 
during the Trail of Tears, or the intergenerational harms that ensued.51  
Additionally, some critics charge that by filing the case in the “courts of the 
conqueror,” Wirt fatally compromised his clients’ position—and indeed the 
legal position of all Indian tribes to follow.52  Why should tribes, whose 
existence predated the Constitution and who did not consent to the 
constitutional compact, recognize the power of the Supreme Court at all?  
After Wirt filed these cases, these questions became largely moot and the 
language of Cherokee Nation and Worcester, based in significant part on 
nineteenth century notions of Indian racial inferiority, now defines the legal 
status of all 500-plus tribes in the United States.53  Viewing the Supreme 
Court’s early Indian jurisprudence in this light, certain critics characterize 
the Cherokee cases, along with the 1823 case of Johnson v. McIntosh, as 
judicial attempts to “legitimize” American Indian conquest, against all 
moral and legal instincts to the contrary.54   
Given that these early cases still form the foundational principles of 
federal Indian law, any account of the relationship between tribes and their 
lawyers must acknowledge the highly charged nature of this history.  From 
the beginning, lawyers have played a powerful role in American Indian life 
and even the most valiant efforts to advocate for tribes in the U.S. legal 
 
 50. See, e.g., David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier:  The New 
Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1574 (1996).  
 51. See Chadwick Smith & Faye Teague, The Response of the Cherokee Nation to the 
Cherokee Outlet Centennial Celebration:  A Legal and Historical Analysis, 29 TULSA L.J. 
263, 266 (1993) (“For the majority of Cherokees, the Trail of Tears is still an open wound.”). 
 52. See Vicenti, supra note 49, at 518. 
 53. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON:  THE REHNQUIST COURT, 
INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 47–70 (2005) (identifying 
Marshall’s overt appeal to Indians’ alleged racial inferiority as a basis for federal supremacy 
in Indian affairs). 
 54. See, e.g., id. 78–79, 112.  The Cherokee cases are the final two in what is known as 
the “Marshall Trilogy” in which the Chief Justice announced what came to be the 
foundational principles of federal Indian law.  The first of these, Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), has also been roundly criticized. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 
21, at 316–17 (“Johnson’s acceptance of the Doctrine of Discovery into United States law 
preserved the legacy of 1,000 years of European racism and colonialism directed against 
non-Western peoples. . . .  While the tasks of conquest and colonization had not yet been 
fully actualized on the entire American continent, the ordinary legal rules and principles of 
federal Indian law set down by Marshall in Johnson v. McIntosh and its discourse of 
conquest ensures that future acts of genocide would proceed on a rationalized, legal basis.”). 
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system may be perceived alternatively as courageous acts of legal 
resistance, insidious compliance with the colonial project, or something in 
between. 
C.  Loyalty and Conflicts 
After the foundational cases, the relationship between tribes and their 
lawyers only became even more fraught with ethical and professional 
issues.  In 1871, Congress not only ended treaty-making with tribes but also 
passed legislation requiring tribes to obtain federal approval before they 
could engage attorneys, even in suits against the United States.55  
Ostensibly passed to protect tribal leaders from unscrupulous professionals, 
this statute often delayed, impeded, and compromised Indians’ access to 
legal services into the contemporary era.56 
Yet individuals, including several early American Indian lawyers, 
maneuvered around bureaucratic limitations to represent tribes.57  Perhaps 
the first Indian woman admitted to practice law, Lyda Burton Conley, was a 
Wyandotte Indian born in 1869 near present-day Kansas City.58 She 
enrolled at the Kansas City School of Law, graduated, and was admitted to 
the Missouri State Bar in 1902.  Foreshadowing the experience of many 
American Indian lawyers to follow, Conley’s professional work took on a 
very personal dimension.  Despite treaty provisions to the contrary, the 
federal government announced in 1906 that it would lift trust restrictions on 
 
 55. See Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544 (1871) (codified as amended at 25 
U.S.C. § 81 (2006)) (requiring approval by the Secretary of the Interior on contracts between 
any person and any Indian tribe or individual Indian for the payment of money or thing of 
value).  Congress later confirmed the requirement for secretarial approval of attorney 
contracts in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. Pub. L. No. 73-383, § 16, 48 Stat. 984, 
987 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 476 (2006)).  Congress finally repealed the 
Secretary’s approval authority over attorney contracts, with certain exceptions, via the Indian 
Tribal Economic Development and Contract Encouragement Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-179, 
114 Stat. 46.  Thus it was not until 2000 that most tribes could hire an attorney without 
approval of the United States. 
 56. In one telling story, tribal attorney Ken Bellmard describes that when he tried to 
represent the Tonkawa Tribe in claims that the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) had interfered 
with tribal elections, he had to get the same BIA to approve his attorney contract. See, e.g., 
Ken Bellmard, Endeavoring To Persevere:  Becoming and Being a Tribal Attorney, 9 KAN. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 752, 756 (2000) (“During our ongoing disputes with the BIA, it took 
approximately one year for the local agency office to approve my contract with the Tonkawa 
Tribe, whereas the individual acting as attorney for the [the political faction allegedly 
favored by the BIA] was approved by the BIA in a week or less.”). 
 57. There is great debate and interest in the question of who was the “first” American 
Indian attorney.  Of course this question is complicated by the fact that in early American 
history, individuals could read for the bar without being formally admitted to practice.  For 
some early candidates, see Rennard Strickland, Yellow Bird’s Song:  The Message of 
America’s First Native American Attorney, 29 TULSA L.J. 247, 247 (1994) (identifying 
Cherokee John Rollin Ridge, 1827–1867, as the first American Indian attorney). See also 
The Cherokee Tobacco Case, 78 U.S. 616, 616 (1870) (in which Cherokee E.C. Boudinot 
may have been both a party and attorney). 
 58. See Stacy L. Leeds & Elizabeth Mashie Gunsaulis, Resistance, Resilience, and 
Reconciliation:  Reflections on Native American Women and the Law, 34 T. JEFFERSON L. 
REV. 303, 307–17 (2012). 
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Wyandotte land and permit the sale of the tribal cemetery to developers.59  
Conley’s mother and grandmother, as well as many others were buried in 
the tribal cemetery, prompting Conley and her sisters to take their shotguns 
and protect the graves around the clock.  After numerous trips to jail, 
Conley decided to try another model of advocacy.  Taking the case all the 
way to the Supreme Court, Conley argued in Conley v. Ballenger60 that the 
Secretary of the Interior should be enjoined from selling an Indian burial 
ground.61  Although the Supreme Court rejected her claim, Conley’s 
passionate advocacy attracted then-Senator (and later Vice President) 
Charles Curtis, a Kaw tribal descendant, to visit the cemetery and introduce 
legislation to protect it from development.62 
The Wyandotte case ultimately served as the antecedent for the 
movement to protect American Indian gravesites, and Conley has become a 
hero to contemporary women.  Yet, the Wyandottes’ situation was also 
exceptional, as very few tribes in the early 1900s were fortunate enough to 
have a tribal member, trained as a lawyer, who could stand up so effectively 
for tribal rights to property and culture.  This was the “assimilation” era in 
which the official federal policy was to eradicate tribes, convert Indians to 
Christianity, replace subsistence lifestyles with farming, break up 
reservations, and force Indians to enter mainstream society as taxpaying 
individuals rather than as members of Indian tribes. 
More typical, and ultimately emblematic, of tribal legal experiences 
during the assimilation era was the case of Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,63 in 
which the Kiowa Tribe lost its challenge to the government’s allotment of 
2.5 million acres of tribal lands.64  In Lone Wolf, the Kiowas argued that the 
“Jerome Agreement,” in which the government had coerced or forged tribal 
consent to the allotment (and obtaining less than the number of signatures 
required by treaty), violated their Fifth Amendment rights to property.65  
The Kiowas, like the Cherokees before them, hired a lawyer with a 
tremendous amount of experience, former U.S. Congressman and federal 
judge William M. Springer—whose fees were paid both by the Indian 
Rights Association and by Texas cattlemen who were leasing Kiowa 
 
 59. Treaty with the Wyandotte, U.S.-Wyandot, Jan. 31, 1855, 10 Stat 1159. 
 60. 216 U.S. 84 (1910). The case was styled Conley v. Ballenger because the Supreme 
Court would not admit Conley to practice, forcing her to become a named plaintiff and make 
the oral argument pro se.  Conley could not find an attorney who would move for her 
admission to the Court. See Kim Dayton, Trespassers, Beware!:  Lyda Burton Conley and 
the Battle for Huron Place Cemetery, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 23–27 (1996). 
 61. See Conley, 216 U.S. at 88. 
 62. See Dayton, supra note 60, at 26–27. 
 63. 187 U.S. 553 (1903). 
 64. Id. at 568 (upholding the power of Congress to abrogate a treaty and allot the lands 
of Kiowa tribe). 
 65. The Jerome Commission, staffed in part by lawyers, was the government agency 
responsible for negotiating allotment agreements with tribes, though as scholars have noted, 
the Commission often used coercive tactics. See WILLIAM HAGAN, TAKING INDIAN LANDS:  
THE CHEROKEE (JEROME) COMMISSION 1889–93, at 236–37 (2003) (describing these tactics 
as applied to the Cherokee Nation). 
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lands.66  In a case that has been forever vilified since, the Supreme Court 
held in Lone Wolf that Congress was perfectly free to abrogate the tribe’s 
treaty rights and distribute the reservation lands to individual Indians, 
selling off the “surplus” to white citizens.67  Lone Wolf came to stand for 
the most expansive formulation of the government’s “plenary power” over 
Indians, and the early 1900s were generally regarded as the low point of 
tribal well-being on every social, economic, and cultural measure. 
Eventually, Congress repudiated the allotment and assimilation policy 
with another act that also had ramifications for legal representation.  In 
1934, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) to confirm the 
ongoing existence of tribes and encourage them to form constitutional-style 
governments.68  Of course, some tribes had retained their own traditional 
governance and others rejected the IRA outright.  Still, with model 
constitutions and informational memoranda distributed by the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (BIA) and active federal involvement in the drafting and 
approval process, hundreds of tribes did adopt IRA constitutions, and these 
documents did not always reflect traditional forms of tribal leadership or 
culture.69  The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic 
Development (HPAIED) has argued that many IRA constitutions were both 
difficult to administer and mismatched with tribal values.  As HPAIED 
scholar Manley Begay has written, for example, the Crow Tribe “operated 
under a constitution drafted with significant non-Native legal advice” that 
“not only produced an enormous, unwieldy legislature, but . . . paid no 
respect to a nation traditionally governed by strong clans . . . and 
hierarchies of chiefs.”70 
Once in place, however, IRA governments became the entities 
empowered (with federal permission) to hire lawyers, even if these 
governments did not necessarily reflect the will of the people.  As Charles 
Wilkinson has written evocatively about the Hopi tribe, for example, the 
lawyer who represented the IRA tribal government negotiating a major 
lease for coal mining on tribal lands in the 1960s was almost certainly not 
 
 66. See Angela R. Riley, The Apex of Congress’ Plenary Power over Indian Affairs:  
The Story of Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, in INDIAN LAW STORIES, supra note 37, at 208.  We do 
not mean here to suggest that Springer’s quality of representation was tainted by a conflict of 
interest, but rather to challenge and contextualize the conceptions of lawyers’ loyalty and 
allegiance to group clients. 
 67. Id. at 223. 
 68. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479 (2006)). 
 69. There is a good bit of discussion in the literature about the extent to which the 
federal government was involved in the drafting and adoption of these constitutions. FELIX S. 
COHEN, ON THE DRAFTING OF TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONS xvi–xxix (David E. Wilkins ed., 2006) 
(Cohen was “opposed to the idea of sending out canned constitutions” to tribes and he made 
clear his view “that constitutions must be worked out in the first place by the Indians in the 
field.”). 
 70. See Manley A. Begay et al., Development, Governance, Culture:  What Are They 
and What Do They Have To Do with Rebuilding Native Nations?, in REBUILDING NATIVE 
NATIONS:  STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 34, 51 (Miriam Jorgensen ed., 
2007). 
 2013] THE CASE OF AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL ATTORNEYS 3103 
representing in any meaningful way the traditional village and clan leaders 
for whom the deal was a cultural anathema.71  And of course it did not help 
that the Hopis’ lawyer was suspected of representing the coal company at 
the same time.72  Yet the Crow and Hopi tribal lawyers, and others during 
the IRA period, had enormous power, both structural and personal, over the 
tribes they represented. 
While Indian tribes had long been pressing treaty claims, the Indian 
Claims Commission Act of 194673 gave them a new platform from which to 
do so, and the ensuing claims process became a major source of business 
for lawyers.  Like many major events in federal Indian law, the creation of 
the Indian Claims Commission (ICC) reflected complicated federal 
motives, with mixed results for the tribes.74  On the one hand, federal 
lawmakers sought to provide a venue for the redress of longstanding Indian 
claims that had otherwise defied legal resolution, a development that many 
Indians and their supporters viewed favorably.75  Lawyers engaged by 
tribes devoted themselves, sometimes heroically, to building massive 
records, complete with historical, geographic, and ethnographic testimony, 
in support of multiyear and even multidecade Indian land claims, and 
sometimes they won large awards.76 
On the other hand, the ICC was formed at the beginning of the 
“termination” era when Congress would increasingly seek to end the special 
relationship with tribes, sell off tribal lands and resources, and integrate 
individuals into mainstream society.77  To those ends, the determination to 
resolve outstanding Indian treaty claims was part of the government’s larger 
objective to get out of the Indian business, notwithstanding its many 
promises to the tribes and their ongoing needs.  Moreover, there were major 
misunderstandings that plagued the ICC litigation:  in some cases, the 
Indian tribal leaders believed that they were seeking actual restitution of the 
lands, all while their lawyers were filing claims for monetary remedies, of 
which the lawyers could collect up to 10 percent in contingency fees.78  On 
 
 71. See CHARLES WILKINSON, FIRE ON THE PLATEAU:  CONFLICT AND ENDURANCE IN THE 
AMERICAN SOUTHWEST 105–23, 276–313 (1999) (discussing the role of the long-time Hopi 
general counsel in representing the tribe in coal mining matters vis-à-vis Peabody Coal and 
the Navajo Nation). 
 72. See id. But see United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 513–14 (2003) 
(denying Navajo Nation’s breach of trust claim in a case where the Interior officials’ ex parte 
communications with Peabody Coal led to approval of a coal mining lease at rate of 12.5 
percent instead of 20 percent, for a loss of $600 million to the tribe). 
 73. See Act of Aug. 8, 1946, ch. 907, 60 Stat. 939 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1a (2006)). 
 74. See Nell Jessup Newton, Compensation, Reparations, & Restitution:  Indian 
Property Claims in the United States, 28 GA. L. REV. 453, 468–71 (1994). See generally Nell 
Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the Conqueror, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 753 (1992) 
(reviewing a number of ICC cases). 
 75. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 4, at 1.06. 
 76. See CHRISTIAN W. MCMILLEN, MAKING INDIAN LAW:  THE HUALAPAI LAND CASE 
AND THE BIRTH OF ETHNOHISTORY 166–83 (2007). 
 77. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 4, at 1.06. 
 78. See Charles F. Wilkinson, The Indian Claims Commission, in INDIAN SELF-RULE 
151–55 (Kenneth R. Philp ed., 1986); see also Traci N. Zlock, Note, The Native American 
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this point, most commentators agree the ICC narrowly construed its 
authority to award equitable remedies, preferring instead monetary awards 
that were often unsatisfying to the tribes.79  In one infamous case, the 
Supreme Court upheld a $106 million award to the Sioux Nation for the 
taking of the Black Hills, but the Sioux people refused to accept any money 
for their sacred lands.80  The non-Indian lawyers collected $10,595,943, 
while the Indians continue—to this day—to live in poverty and seek the 
return of their land.81  In another case, a band of Western Shoshone claimed 
that the lawyer alleging to represent them had not been so authorized,82 and 
in still another, a tribe claimed that the lawyers had stipulated to reservation 
boundaries excluding lands on which tribal members were then living.83  
The courts upheld the judgments in these cases over the tribes’ objections 
about their lawyers.  In short, the ICC period brought many lawyers into the 
practice of Indian law, with great potential to remedy historic wrongs, but 
left a legacy of Indian disappointment in, and in some cases contempt for, 
the legal profession.84 
D.  Legal and Political Empowerment 
Finally, after decades of shifting federal Indian policy reflected in the 
discussion above, a sea change occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, ultimately 
leading to the tribal “self-determination” era.  As part of the war on poverty 
launched in the mid-1960s under the Office of Economic Opportunity, 
federally funded legal services programs were established around the 
country to provide legal services to poor and disadvantaged people.85  
Many of these programs were located on or near Indian reservations and 
 
Tribe As a Client:  An Ethical Analysis, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 159, 160 (1996) (stating 
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 79. See DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 269 
(6th ed. 2011). 
 80. See United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980). 
 81. See EDWARD LAZARUS, BLACK HILLS, WHITE JUSTICE:  THE SIOUX NATION VERSUS 
THE UNITED STATES 1775 TO THE PRESENT 403–28 (1991); see also Kirsten Matoy Carlson, 
Priceless Property, GA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 2–3), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2030248 (noting that even though the 
Treasury Department account in which the Sioux Nation award was deposited now holds 
over a billion dollars, the Sioux tribes refuse distribution because “money—even $1.3 billion 
dollars—could not compensate them for the taking of their beloved Black Hills”). 
 82. See, e.g., United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39, 41–45 (1985) (holding that Western 
Shoshone had been compensated for their land even though they refused to cooperate in 
distribution of the funds). 
 83. See, e.g., Pueblo of Santo Domingo v. United States, 647 F.2d 1087 (Ct. Cl. 1981) 
(holding that the tribe’s request to withdraw from a 1969 stipulation made by its attorney 
without its permission was untimely). 
 84. See Vicenti, supra note 49, at 527; see also E. Richard Hart, The Indian Claims 
Commission, in INDIAN SELF-RULE, supra note 78, at 156–58 (describing the problems of 
legal representation in other Indian Claims Commission cases). 
 85. See CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE:  THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS 
191–98 (2005). 
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helped tribes develop infrastructure and obtain legal representation in key 
cases.86  California Indian Legal Services was founded in 1967 to represent 
tribes and individual Indians who had long been denied any legal rights or 
recognition in California or nationally.87  In Washington, D.C., the National 
Congress of American Indians presented a collective voice in national 
Indian politics, and leaders such as the Standing Rock Sioux tribal member 
Vine Deloria, who graduated from law school in 1970, articulated the case 
for American Indian self-government.88  Through these and other vehicles, 
American Indians made clear that they were here to stay and newly inspired 
to assert their collective and individual rights. 
Eventually, the United States realized that it could no longer keep trying 
to “end the Indian problem.”89  In 1970, President Richard Nixon 
announced the birth of a new policy of “self-determination” that would 
respect tribal autonomy in governance, education, economic development, 
and culture, while maintaining historic federal obligations to support all of 
these initiatives.  The Indian Self-Determination and Education Act was 
passed in 1974 and followed by dozens of statutes promoting the goals that 
Nixon had announced.90  At the same time, tribes experienced victories in 
major court cases, including the recognition of off-reservation fishing rights 
in United States v. Washington, with the capacity to restore tribal 
subsistence practices.91  The tribes in Washington were represented by lead 
counsel David Getches of the new Native American Rights Fund (NARF), 
established in 1969 with funding from the Ford Foundation, to improve 
representation for Indian tribes.92  From its inception, NARF devoted itself 
to providing the best legal representation for tribes, a concept that would 
soon include American Indian leadership of the organization.  In 1973, 
Getches relinquished the NARF directorship to John Echohawk, a Pawnee 
Indian who had graduated from the University of New Mexico Law School, 
and who would develop NARF into the nation’s preeminent public interest 
firm advocating for Indian tribes.  As Echohawk later recounted, suggesting 
a dynamic of empowerment in tribal advocacy, “There were not very many 
Native American attorneys around in those days but [Getches] understood 
the importance of Native American leadership in the organization.  He was 
my mentor and supported me in becoming the Executive Director in 
1973.”93  Along with many dedicated non-Indian lawyers, American Indian 
 
 86. See, e.g., Bowers & Carpenter, supra note 37, at 489, 503–07 (on the role of poverty-
prevention programs and legal services organizations in the revitalization of the Yurok, 
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 87. See CILS History, CAL. INDIAN LEGAL SERVICES, http://www.calindian.org/about/
cils-history (last visited Apr. 19, 2013). 
 88. See WILKINSON, supra note 85, at 102–12. 
 89. See RED POWER:  THE AMERICAN INDIANS FIGHT FOR FREEDOM (Alvin Josephy, Jr. et 
al. eds., 1971). 
 90. See Indian Self Determination & Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450 (2006). 
 91. United States v. Washington, 66 F.R.D. 477 (W.D. Wash. 1974). 
 92. See NATIVE AM. RTS. FUND, http://www.narf.org (last visited Apr. 19, 2013). 
 93. John Echohawk, Remarks at the David H. Getches Memorial (Aug. 11, 2011), 
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lawyers brought their experience, energy, and empathy to major cases in 
Indian law.  One of the first Indian women attorneys at NARF, the Ponca-
Creek lawyer Yvonne Knight, explained, “When you go out there to 
represent Indian people, you see your family, your brothers, your sisters, 
your nephews, your mother and father, your grandparents.  You realize the 
devastating impact that society can have on people because they are a 
different culture, because their skin is a different color.”94 
Things were clearly changing in the legal representation of tribes by the 
1970s.  In 1978, the Indian Law Resource Center (ILRC) was established 
by Tim Coulter of the Citizen Potawatomi Nation, to advocate for 
indigenous peoples in both domestic and international forums.95  Even more 
broadly, tribal members, in partnership with non-Indian allies, were taking 
the lead in Indian law matters.  Indeed, an explosion in tribal lawyering 
went hand-in-hand with the self-determination era.96  As tribes reasserted 
treaty rights and tested the bounds of tribal sovereignty, they needed 
litigators.  As they became more involved in business transactions, 
especially gaming and complex financing, they needed commercial lawyers.  
As they pressed for legislative solutions to policy problems, they needed 
lobbyists.  As they developed legal departments, court systems, and 
legislative-regulatory infrastructure, they needed government lawyers.  As 
they began to engage in the international human rights system, they needed 
advocates at the United Nations, Organization of American States, and so 
on. 
For many of the same reasons of empowerment and opportunity, more 
and more American Indians started going to college and law school during 
the self-determination era.  The American Indian Law Center at the 
University of New Mexico, first under the leadership of Fred Hart and Tom 
Christopher, and later Philip “Sam” Deloria, launched a program to recruit 
and prepare American Indians for law school, providing rigorous training 
and a pipeline for American Indians in the profession.97  As a result of 
student advocacy, universities around the country, including Harvard, 
which was originally chartered to educate both “English” and Indian youth, 
were recognizing an obligation to recruit Indian students and teach Indian 
law.98  At law schools, professors from both the academy and practice 
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including Rennard Strickland, Ralph Johnson, Monroe Price, Reid 
Chambers, and many others were developing federal Indian Law into a 
discrete field of study attracting both Indian and non-Indian students who 
intended to practice in the field.99 
From 1988 to 2001, thirteen members or descendants of tribes, namely 
S. James Anaya, Raymond Cross, Heather Kendall-Miller, Rodney Lewis, 
Arlinda Locklear, Melody McCoy, Marilyn Miles, Terry Pechota, 
G. William Rice, Martin Seneca, Dale White, Jeanne Whiteing, and Susan 
Williams, appeared as counsel for tribal interests before the Supreme Court 
in major American Indian cases that determined tribal rights in tax, water, 
property, religion, jurisdiction, and other areas.100  Many others participated 
in major legislative movements, such as the notable Pawnee attorney, 
Walter Echo-Hawk, whose advocacy for American Indian human remains 
and religious freedoms, contributed to the passage of several major statutes.  
Time and time again, these attorneys recounted a personal dimension of 
their advocacy.  As Echo-Hawk said after the burial of hundreds of 
thousands of Indian remains, “Many of them were likely my own 
relatives.”101  Tom Fredericks, a member of the Mandan, Hidatsa, and 
Arikara Nation, who has shared the indelible childhood memory of losing 
the family ranch to government condemnation of reservation lands, went on 
to represent tribes in government, regulatory, and transactional matters, 
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especially concerning land and natural resources.102  Many non-Indians 
have also demonstrated lifelong commitments to advocate for tribes and 
have done so with great success.103 
Not long ago, the tribal attorney and Mohawk tribal member Dale White 
observed, “Indian law is definitely a ‘growth industry’” with more and 
more opportunities for tribal lawyers.104  As we write in 2013, the practice 
of Indian law is still growing and changing.  NARF, along with the ILRC, 
legal services organizations, and dozens of law firms, both large and small, 
are providing legal counsel directly to tribes—in tribal, state, federal, and 
international matters.105  Many of the 566 federally recognized tribes have 
in-house legal counsel, and many have entire legal departments and offices, 
both on reservations and in Washington, D.C.  The number of American 
Indian lawyers has grown from estimates of twenty-five total in the 1960s 
to over 3,000 in 2006.106  The Federal Bar Association107 and ABA108 both 
have sections devoted to American Indian Law, and there is a very active 
network of professionals in the field, including national, state, and tribal bar 
associations devoted to Indian law practice.109  The self-determination 
movement continues to thrive in Indian Country, shaping both external 
relations with federal and state governments and the internal revitalization 
of tribal law, institutions, and societies.  There have been major setbacks, 
such as the Supreme Court’s backlash against American Indian rights from 
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1988 to the present, but overall this is a time of unprecedented growth and 
opportunity in American Indian law.  It is this legal landscape, with all of 
its professional opportunities and challenges that the contemporary tribal 
lawyer inhabits. 
E.  The Contemporary Tribal Lawyer 
By “tribal lawyer,” we mean a lawyer who represents an American 
Indian tribe.  This definition excludes federal government lawyers who 
often work on Indian law matters, both for and against tribes, but are 
formally representing the United States.110  It also excludes, for the most 
part, lawyers for individual Indians, unless those individual Indians are 
elected tribal leaders whose participation in litigation actually signifies the 
tribe’s participation.  Tribal lawyers can be American Indian or not, and we 
comment below on some of the particular issues raised by this question of 
identity.  We should say at the outset that there are now thousands of 
lawyers working for Indian tribes and we cannot name all of them or 
describe the work of each. 
The paradigmatic example of the tribal lawyer is one who works 
exclusively or primarily for one of the 566 federally recognized Indian 
tribes.  Depending on the size of the tribe, the office might have one to ten 
lawyers who work on a variety of issues.  A tribal lawyer who is “in-
house,” usually lives and works on or near the reservation of the tribal 
client; tribal lawyers who work at firms or other organizations live and 
work in cities, small towns, and rural areas around the country.  If a typical 
job description for tribal attorney exists, it is to represent the tribe acting 
through its elected officials—possibly including the tribal president, chief, 
or chair; the legislative counsel; and other leaders—in the business of tribal 
government.  Tribal attorneys provide advice on the enactment and 
interpretation of legislation; represent the tribe in tribal, state, and federal 
court litigation; negotiate with the local, state, and federal governments; 
maintain relationships with the BIA and other federal agencies; and advise 
the tribe on financial matters and commercial transactions.111  
Substantively, tribal lawyers may work on everything from an initial 
political and organizational struggle for federal recognition, to cultural 
questions surrounding the repatriation of religious items, to complex 
financings for casinos and other commercial developments, to major 
litigation over treaty rights and jurisdiction.112 
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Tribes also engage outside counsel for legal representation, either to 
serve as general counsel if they do not have an in-house office or for 
representation in specialty areas.  Boutique law firms specializing in federal 
Indian law and large law firms with departments in federal Indian law 
handle many of these needs.  Some tribes have a “go-to” law firm with 
whom they have worked for generations, while others shop for the 
appropriate counsel in a particular case, and still others keep a lot of their 
work in house.113 
Tribal attorney Ken Bellmard has been an attorney for several Oklahoma 
tribes and written reflectively about his work.114  He describes his career as 
spanning many substantive areas and skill sets, and highly affected by 
politics.  Bellmard is a Kaw tribal member who was first hired by the 300-
member Tonkawa Tribe and quickly received an education in tribal 
lawyering: 
The Tonkawa Tribe is . . . established pursuant to a page and one-half 
constitution, and governed by a elected committee of three people.  The 
fact that the Tonkawa Tribe was governed by just three people allowed 
the Tribe to deal with matters very quickly and efficiently, but because the 
Tribe was so small family relationships were very strong and very 
contentious.  My education as a tribal attorney was about to begin. 
With respect to client identity, Bellmard is clear that “[b]eing a tribal 
attorney for a small tribe for the most part requires one to be an advocate 
for the tribe’s government, i.e., the elected body.”115  In this capacity, as the 
 
“evolved from a small Indian tribe that operated on a shoestring budget for years after its 
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University of New Mexico Law School, Petoskey represented his own tribe in a wide array 
of work including litigation, commercial transactions, intergovernmental diplomacy, and 
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legal representative for the tribe acting through its tribal government, the 
tribal attorney will (1) “be involved in intra-tribal disputes (removals and 
recalls)”; (2) “necessarily be involved in disputes with the state and local 
government (sovereignty issues)”; and (3) “will be involved in disputes 
with the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).”116  Bellmard describes the latter 
disputes as the most difficult for him and his tribal clients, remembering 
instances where, in his view, the BIA seemed to retaliate when the tribe 
took “progressive” positions.117  After the Tonkawa leadership decided to 
work on a nuclear waste facility, the BIA allegedly supported a group of 
tribal citizens who tried to remove the elected officials.118 
Bellmard describes these external and internal impediments to 
representing the tribe as frustrating—saying that he learned that “you 
cannot expect much help from the BIA and that at any given time half the 
tribal membership is going to think you are a devil.”119  An equally 
frustrating experience occurred when, during his representation of the 
Osage Tribe, the United States “de-recognized” the Osage Nation (which 
would later be restored).  Bellmard notes that he went on to more “positive 
and professionally rewarding” experiences as attorney for the Miami Tribe, 
and also worked for the Absentee Shawnee, Otoe-Missouri, Ponca, and 
Comanche Tribes.120  In this process, he developed certain skill sets, such 
as in commercial dealings, and recognized other areas, such as repatriation, 
in which he lacked the necessary cultural competence and referred the 
matter to another attorney.121 
Several points can be generalized about the work of the tribal attorney in 
the self-determination era.  Many tribes are still involved in major litigation, 
especially in cases testing the scope of treaty rights and tribal jurisdiction.  
Some of these cases may be resolved through intergovernmental 
agreements, particularly in the tax and gaming contexts.  Relatedly, many 
tribes are engaged in major development projects to fund the tribal 
government and economy.  And, internally, tribal governments are focused 
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 119. Id. at 756. 
 120. Id. at 756–60. 
 121. Id. at 757–58; see also Teddye Snell, Media Ousted from UKB Meeting, TAHLEQUAH 
DAILY PRESS (Nov. 7, 2011), http://tahlequahdailypress.com/local/x471035951/Media-
ousted-from-UKB-meeting (describing Ken Bellmard as “Attorney General” for the United 
Keetoowah Band of Indians in incident where press was barred from tribal government 
meeting). 
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on “nation building” including the reform of legal institutions and law, such 
as tribal courts and legislative codes.  Tribal lawyers find themselves 
representing tribes in all of these capacities and more.  As Bellmard’s 
comments begin to suggest, this work brings both particular challenges and 
opportunities for the tribal lawyer. 
Over the course of his career, Bellmard says that he “changed from a 
young attorney wanting to ‘save’ all the Oklahoma tribes into a cynical 
experienced attorney who understands that all tribes are different and are 
potential competitors to one another in the business world. . . .  I have 
become more of a ‘mechanic’ rather than an ‘evangelist.’”122  This point is 
critical and underscores the notion that the work and role of the tribal 
attorney is just as fraught with ethical complexity as any other practice, if 
not more so.  The anecdotes described in this Article, with a few obvious 
exceptions, should not be oversimplified to suggest that there is a 
dichotomy between “good” and “bad” attorneys for tribes.  If anything, the 
involvement of tribes in government, business, culture, and religion 
suggests that tribal lawyers will be called on to juggle different values and 
objectives.123  Moreover, as tribes work to emerge from layers of 
subordination experienced through the colonial process, they and their 
lawyers engage in various strategies, some of which may be more or less 
appealing to certain constituencies and audiences.124  Today’s tribal lawyer 
may be fighting to protect tribal sovereignty against the encroachments of 
state and federal governments, and doing so as a lobbyist, jockeying for 
influence with legislators;125 working to address tribal poverty and 
unemployment through economic development strategies that include 
 
 122. Bellmard, supra note 56, at 759. 
 123. See, e.g., Gale Couery Toensig, Poarch Creek Band Stops Controversial Casino 
Expansion on Hickory Ground Sacred Site, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Oct. 17, 2012, 
available at http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/article/poarch-band-stops-
controversial-casino-expansion-on-hickory-ground-sacred-site-140654 (describing 
communications by tribal attorneys representing tribal leaders on opposite sides of proposal 
to develop casino on historic Creek town site and burial ground). 
 124. See generally Kristen A. Carpenter & Angela R. Riley, The Jurisgenerative Moment 
in Indigenous Human Rights, 102 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2220573. 
 125. The most infamous tribal lobbyist of all time, Jack Abramoff, “was at the center of a 
lobbying conglomerate that defrauded Indian tribes of millions and used much of that money 
to try to win favor with members of Congress and their senior staff members.” Neil A. 
Lewis, Abramoff Gets Four Years in Prison for Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2008, at 
A13.  While Abramoff, who was convicted of corruption and tax evasion and sentenced to 
four years in prison, engaged in conduct that was clearly illegal, other lobbyists face more 
nuanced ethical dilemmas, such as how to handle tensions between wealthy and poor tribal 
interests, tribes with and without large land bases, and whether to represent corporate or state 
interests adverse to tribes other than the particular client.  In the best models, tribal lobbyists 
partner with other Indian activists to pass important legislation, such as the Violence Against 
Women Act with its new provisions for American Indian women. See, e.g., Rob Capriccioso, 
President Barack Obama’s VAWA Law Signing Spotlights Native Women Warriors, INDIAN 
COUNTRY TODAY, Mar. 11, 2013, available at http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/
2013/03/11/president-barack-obamas-vawa-law-signing-spotlights-native-women-warriors-
148105. 
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casino gaming, payday lending, or natural resource extraction;126 or 
defending the tribe’s interests in choosing its own citizens, developing its 
institutions, and protecting tribal finances—in cases that may pit the tribe 
against minorities excluded from tribal citizenship, employees trying to 
organize labor unions, or individuals injured on tribal property.127  In the 
next part, we analyze the role of tribal lawyers in the myriad contexts where 
they work against the backdrop of the professional responsibility literature’s 
conceptions of the role of lawyers more generally. 
III.  PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGY, ROLE, AND RULES 
MEET TRIBAL LAWYERING 
In this part we seek to integrate the story of Indian tribes and the law with 
conceptions of lawyering.  We first describe the dominant model of 
lawyering, known as the Standard Conception, as it reflects a strong 
attachment to the rule of law and representation of clients as individuals.  
We then consider how Indian tribes often come to legal representation with 
different baselines—namely a complicated relationship with the rule of law, 
and core interests held by a group with particular cultural values—that 
reveal certain limitations of the Rules as they apply in the attorney-tribal 
client relationship. 
A.  The Dominant Professional Ideology and Role of American Lawyers 
The American legal profession consists of well over a million lawyers 
who practice in a variety of practice areas, arenas, and organizational 
settings.  And while these lawyers subscribe to different schools of thought, 
pursue different values, and promote different commitments, they by and 
large adhere to a dominant professional ideology grounded in a few basic 
assumptions about the rule of law and the role of lawyers.  In America, 
opined Thomas Paine, “law is king” constituting the social glue that holds 
our diverse melting pot together.  Law is a civic religion; its constitutive 
documents—the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill 
of Rights—capture and define what it means to be an American.  The rule 
of law is not merely an acceptance of law and order as a necessary 
condition, but an embrace of the rule of law as a constitutive feature of 
America that embodies a way of life in which law emerges not merely as a 
way to resolve disputes but as the way to engage in private and public 
decision making.  In particular, it is a conception of law that treats 
 
 126. For a primer on tribal economic development, see Lorie M. Graham, An 
Interdisciplinary Approach to American Indian Economic Development, 80 N.D. L. REV. 
597, 599–608 (2004) (describing the right to development as a human right that requires 
nuanced analysis of social, cultural, and other conditions in indigenous context). 
 127. For examples of tribal court cases evaluating civil rights in Indian Country, see 
MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW 351–82 (2011). 
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individuals and the exercise of individual autonomy as the basic unit of 
society.128 
Lawyers, accordingly, are high priests of this civic religion, aristocratic 
members of a ruling class, guardians of the rule of law, which means 
zealous advocates of individual autonomy.  Law is thus understood as a 
shield against intrusion on the individual and celebrated as a sword in 
defense of individual autonomy and the aggressive pursuit of self-interest.  
And this conception of law and lawyers is by no means a theoretical or 
abstract exercise.  It informs the Standard Conception of American lawyers’ 
professional ideology, is reflected in its twin postulates of zealous advocacy 
and nonaccountability, and it defines the role of lawyers.129 
The principle of zealous advocacy portrays lawyers as knights in shining 
armor.  Whether defending individuals against accusations of wrongdoing 
by the state or other individuals, or negotiating claims on behalf of clients’ 
self-interest, lawyers emerge as a positive force pursuing the most 
important of values:  clients’ exercise of individual autonomy.  Lawyers’ 
“warm zeal” and aggression on behalf of clients is explained exactly in 
terms of the cardinal importance of the subject of defense—the individual 
and his or her zone of autonomy.130 
Nonaccountability neatly follows.  Exactly because autonomous clients 
are celebrated as the core unit of society, and the goal of lawyers is to 
enhance clients’ autonomy, clients and clients alone are morally and legally 
deemed responsible for the objectives of the attorney-client relationships.  
Lawyers, the mouthpiece of clients, are not morally or otherwise 
accountable for the goals they help clients pursue exactly because making 
lawyers responsible would compromise the position of clients as 
autonomous kings vested with sole authority and thus responsibility for 
their conduct.  Finally, the Standard Conception informs the role of 
American lawyers as first and foremost representatives of clients, with only 
 
 128. Robert W. Gordon, “The Ideal and the Actual in the Law”:  Fantasies and Practices 
of New York City Lawyers, 1879–1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS:  LAWYERS IN POST–CIVIL 
WAR AMERICA 51, 51–74 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984) (exploring the elevated role and 
status of lawyers in American society); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 
301–11 (Henry Reeve trans., 1900) (discussing the status of lawyers as America’s 
aristocracy); THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 29 (1776) (observing “that in America The 
Law Is King”); Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers As America’s Governing Class:  The Formation 
and Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer’s Role, 8 U. CHI. L. 
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381 (2001). 
 129. William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy:  Procedural Justice and Professional 
Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 115–16; see also Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral 
Ethical Role:  A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 
613, 617; Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 
66 CALIF. L. REV. 669, 672–75 (1978). See generally Russell G. Pearce, Professional 
Responsibility for the Age of Obama:  Reviewing David Luban, Legal Ethics and Human 
Dignity, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1594, 1600 (2009) (book review); Murray L. Schwartz, 
The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, in THE GOOD LAWYER:  LAWYERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’ 
ETHICS 150–71 (David Luban ed., 1984). 
 130. Eli Wald, Loyalty In Limbo:  The Peculiar Case of Attorneys’ Loyalty to Clients, 
40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 909 (2009); see also Pepper, supra note 129. 
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token references to the minor roles of officers of the legal system and public 
citizens.131 
Critics of the Standard Conception, to be sure, abound.  William Simon, 
for example, grounds his theory of law practice and the role of lawyers in 
justice, rather than in the pursuit of client interests narrowly conceived.  
Lawyers should not, argues Simon, help clients pursue goals that impose 
injustice on others, and lawyers should listen to clients’ conceptions of 
justice rather than impute to their clients objectives and goals.  But 
ultimately, what emerges from Simon’s theory is a herculean lawyer, a 
social engineer of sorts who knows best how to pursue justice on behalf of 
clients.132  Tony Kronman, another critic of the Standard Conception, 
bemoans the decline of lawyers as statesmen, philosopher kings, and social 
engineers who, through the exercise of practical wisdom and professional 
judgment, act as the benevolent governing class and natural leaders of our 
society.133  Brad Wendel advocates near religious allegiance or fidelity to 
the law, in which the law is put on a pedestal and lawyers become its high 
priests.134  Ironically, common to all of these critics of the Standard 
Conception is an unquestionable belief in the law as a positive, desirable 
constitutive aspect of American life.  Simon never questions the centrality 
of law to justice, and all three scholars conceive of lawyers as powerful 
actors vested with great responsibility for the public and private good.  
Even David Luban, who rejects role morality and advocates for common 
morality as the cornerstone of lawyers’ professional ideology and role does 
not question the centrality of law and the inherent relevance of the rule of 
law to core values such as fairness and dignity.135 
B.  The Dominant Ideology and Tribal Lawyering 
It is exactly this profound trust and love of the law, in its Anglo-
American incarnation, that American Indian tribes do not necessarily share.  
Indeed, European and American legal institutions and actors used the rule 
of law to displace, or attempt to displace, tribes’ own legal traditions and 
systems, and thereby disrupt tribal governments and cultures.136  In a 
 
 131. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the application of the Standard Conception to 
group lawyers, including government attorneys. 
 132. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE:  A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 
54–62 (1998). 
 133. See generally ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER:  FAILING IDEALS OF THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION (1993). 
 134. See generally W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO THE LAW (2010). 
 135. See generally DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY (2007).  For a 
critical analysis of the role autonomous self-interest plays in contemporary thinking, practice 
and regulation of lawyers, see Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, The Obligation of Lawyers To 
Heal Civic Culture:  Confronting the Ordeal of Incivility in the Practice of Law, 34 U. ARK. 
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011); Eli Wald & Russell G. Pearce, Beyond Cardboard Lawyers 
in Legal Ethics, 15 LEGAL ETHICS 147 (2012) (reviewing W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS 
AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010)). 
 136. Rennard Strickland, Take Us By the Hand:  Challenges of Becoming an Indian 
Lawyer, 2 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 47, 55 (1974). 
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historical context, then, the rule of law stood not as a desirable cornerstone 
of society but as a more complicated device that tribes confronted during 
the process of conquest and colonialism. 
On the one hand, European and American governments relied on the rule 
of law as a “legitimizing” factor in the dispossession of Indian lands, 
removal of Indian peoples, and imposition of colonial, state, and federal 
governing powers.137  In this view, the rule of law was a foreign tool of 
colonialist aggression, and lawyers were not knights in shining armor but 
manipulative instruments of abuse who, even in good faith, fatally 
compromised tribes’ positions and values.138  Whereas the rule of law is 
billed by the Standard Conception as America’s social glue, to tribes, the 
very same law functioned to justify conquest and impose Anglo-American 
values and expediencies on Indian claims.  As the discussion above about 
the Marshall Trilogy suggests, the Supreme Court first justified conquest of 
American Indians by reference to the Doctrine of Discovery.  Subsequently, 
tribes found that the courts would change and modify the rule of law to 
facilitate the colonial project.  Tribes negotiated treaties in good faith, only 
to have the Supreme Court hold that Congress could break them;139 tribes 
litigated their ancient land claims in the ICC, only to learn that the courts 
would limit their remedies to monetary damages.140  Today, the Supreme 
Court tells us that even when tribes reacquire their own treaty-guaranteed 
lands on the open market, they cannot reclaim governing authority over 
them because equities and statutory interpretation favors the non-Indian 
settlers and governments that prefer state jurisdiction.141  In these 
experiences, the law, legal system, and lawyers are all instruments of the 
colonizing machine.  If the law is “king,” it is a monarch bent on oppressing 
American Indian people. 
From another perspective, however, Indian tribes have always been 
agents of their own realities.  Even faced with horrible choices in the face of 
destructive forces, tribal leaders have nonetheless made meaningful and 
informed choices, including use of the rule of law as a tool of resistance.  In 
the 1830s, for example, the Cherokees were faced with mounting personal 
violence and destruction of property at the hands of white settlers.  It was 
only when petitions to Congress and the President failed that the Cherokee 
National Council authorized Principal Chief John Ross to resort to the 
 
 137. The leading source here is WILLIAMS, supra note 21. 
 138. See Vicenti, supra note 49. 
 139. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (holding that congressional 
abrogation of Indian treaty’s land guarantees is a nonjusticiable political question). 
 140. See, e.g., Newton, supra note 74, at 469. 
 141. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 203 (2005) (“The 
Oneidas long ago relinquished the reins of government and cannot regain them through 
open-market purchases from current titleholders.”). For scholarship criticizing the Sherrill 
opinion, see Sarah Krakoff, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York:  A 
Regretful Postscript to the Taxation Chapter in Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 
41 TULSA L. REV. 5 (2005); Joseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths of the Law:  Title, 
Possession & Sacred Obligations, 38 CONN. L. REV. 605 (2006). 
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courts to try to save the Cherokee Nation.142  The Cherokee Nation used a 
deliberative process in its decisions to engage legal counsel in the struggle, 
seeking to hire the most effective lawyers, even while struggling to pay 
them.143  Ross’s own view of the situation, as articulated to the Cherokee 
National Council, was that “in the appearance of impossibilities, there is 
still hope,”144 a statement that suggests not naïveté but resilience in the face 
of overwhelming odds. 
Moreover, despite the immediate devastation suffered by the Cherokees 
and other tribes during the Removal era, it is also true that the rules 
announced in the Cherokee Nation and Worcester cases—that Indian 
nations retain reserved rights of self-governance and property, and the 
United States has an obligation to protect those interests until such time as it 
chooses expressly to extinguish them—have in many cases served a real 
and meaningful function for tribes.145  As we write in 2013, 566 federally 
recognized tribal nations remain self-governing entities, often focused on 
revitalizing their cultures and societies, with some legal protection against 
the encroachments of states.146  Yet, when those tribes are faced with 
challenges, they again often turn to the American legal system to vindicate 
their rights, sometimes successfully.  Courts, along with the legislative and 
executive branches, do recognize treaty rights, self-government, and federal 
trust obligations, to some extent.147  In this perspective, the law is indeed a 
powerful tool for American Indian advocacy. 
At the end of the day, both narratives reveal certain core truths.  The 
United States has used the law as a tool of conquest and colonization with 
devastating effects on Indian tribes; and tribes have used the law as a tool 
 
 142. See GARY E. MOULTON, JOHN ROSS, CHEROKEE CHIEF 34–52 (1978).  Moulton 
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at 44–45. 
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 144. Id. at 41. 
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JUST. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Fletcher, Looking to the East]; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, 
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of resistance and protection, with some success in the legal institutions of 
the United States.  Today, as a result, the conversation among Indian law 
scholars often focuses on how best “decolonize” Indian law, both in its 
federal and tribal law incarnations.148 Suggestions include reversing 
problematic rules of federal Indian common law,149 engaging in federal 
legal reform through legislative and administrative programs,150 promoting 
advocacy in international human rights forums,151 and a more intense focus 
on the role of tribal institutions in reforming their own laws.152  On the last 
point, tribes today are revitalizing their own tribal legal systems—legal 
systems that in many respects have been infected with the vestiges of 
colonialism—by reinfusing their own legal institutions with tribal values, 
norms, and procedures that have both internal and external legitimacy.153  
In short, the relationship between tribes and the law is complicated one and 
lawyers play a complicated role in it. 
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Here we seek to integrate this story—of Indian tribes and the law—with 
conceptions of lawyering.  We reflect on the limitations of the dominant 
model and alternative conceptions that are already functioning in American 
Indian communities and that may enlarge the understanding of group 
lawyering more broadly.  The dominant understanding of law produces and 
legitimizes the Standard Conception of zealous advocacy and lawyers’ 
nonaccountability as the baseline for lawyering.  In tribal contexts, a 
different understanding of law undermines the legitimacy of the Standard 
Conception.  The core inherent unit of representation in the case of tribes is 
not an individual but the tribe, and the core mission is not the assertion of 
individual autonomy but collective group rights, self-determination, and the 
preservation of cultural values and tradition. 
Zealous representation, as typically construed, may not be a sufficiently 
capacious model for effective representation of goals that necessarily 
require attention to relationships and the revitalization of the tribal 
community.  To be sure, zealous advocacy is appropriate in some 
circumstances—for example, when the effective representation of tribes 
calls for aggressive advocacy vis-à-vis powerful federal, state, or corporate 
interests.  It may even be appropriate when tribes defend against suits by 
tribal members.154  We emphatically support the idea that tribes, like all 
other clients, deserve a well-trained lawyer who will use the law to 
advocate powerfully for them.155  For generations, the lack of access to 
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such legal counsel was a major, disempowering factor for tribes.  But in an 
era of self-determination and decolonization of Indian law, zealous 
advocacy is by no means the default modus operandi in every instance of 
tribal representation.  Indian law is increasingly characterized by 
intergovernmental negotiations and transactions with business partners that 
may call for constructive engagement as much as robust assertions of 
rights.156  Even with respect to litigation, some advocates have suggested 
that the most contested tribal claims—such as religious freedoms and treaty 
rights—should be decided with attention to the “intercultural” relations that 
must inform what they see as the ultimate goal of “reconciliation.”157  This 
point is particularly apt when it comes to conflicts with neighboring 
communities, which may include longtime non-Indian residents or other 
indigenous peoples.158  Within the tribal community, zealous advocacy may 
disrupt tribal relations, such as those within clans or societies, or usurp the 
authority of traditional dispute resolution by village or religious leaders.159 
Similarly, while nonaccountability may be appropriate in the context of 
empowering individual clients to assert their autonomous self-interest while 
acting as the client’s mouthpiece, it is far from intuitive or inevitable in 
cultures where all individuals, including legal professionals, may be 
expected to be accountable to the community, its needs, and its values.160  
Again, there are difficulties associated with this view.  Additional 
professional and ethical obligations, particularly emerging and undeveloped 
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ones, may disincentivize lawyers from taking Indian clients, diminishing 
the opportunities for tribes to secure the best possible advice and counsel.  
This may be particularly true when tribes need lawyers who practice in 
specialized areas—commercial lending or appellate advocacy—where a 
responsibility to become expert on American Indian culture and history has 
simply not been part of the lawyer’s training.  Yet, it is also true that 
without some guidance on accountability, lawyers may play an unwitting 
role in extending the legacy of conquest and harming the indigenous clients 
that they seek to serve.161 
Importantly, challenging the dominant understanding of law and the 
professional ideology of lawyers is not an academic exercise.  While the 
dominant culture of autonomous self-interest no doubt impacts lawyers 
irrespective of their specialized professional ideology and rules of 
professional conduct, the Standard Conception informs and shapes the 
Rules of Professional Conduct that actually govern the behavior of 
practicing lawyers.  Accordingly, an individually inspired, autonomy 
enhancing ideology that ill fits the practice of lawyers for groups will tend 
to produce Rules that ill serve tribal lawyers. 
C.  From Ideology to Role and Rules 
The Preamble to the Model Rules states that a lawyer “is a representative 
of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special 
responsibility for the quality of justice.”162  A plain reading of the Preamble 
might suggest that a lawyer’s role may be conceived of as a three-legged 
stool, with all three components of the role—representative of clients, 
officer of the legal system, and public citizen—weighing equally.  But it is 
clear that the Rules treat representation of clients in the spirit of 
empowering individual pursuit of self-interest as a lawyer’s primary goal.  
Rules 1.1–1.18, 2.1–2.4, 5.1–5.7, and 7.1–7.6 essentially deal with the role 
of the lawyer as a client representative.  Only the much briefer sections 3 
and 4 deal with some limited duties as an officer of the court, and section 6 
indirectly states some aspirational duties as a public citizen.  Indeed, the 
only specific elaboration in the Rules regarding the lawyer’s role as an 
“officer of the legal system” as opposed to an officer of the court comes in 
the Preamble.  Comment 5 states cryptically that “[a] lawyer should use the 
law’s procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or 
intimidate others.  A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system 
and for those who serve it,”163 and comment 13 states that “[l]awyers play a 
vital role in the preservation of society.  The fulfillment of this role requires 
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an understanding by lawyers of their relationship to our legal system.  The 
Rules of Professional Conduct, when properly applied, serve to define that 
relationship.”164  Comment 13 is nothing short of ironic because other than 
that very comment, nothing in the Rules “serves to define” the relationship 
of lawyers with the legal system. 
Worse, the only clear reference to a lawyer’s role as a public citizen is 
even shorter, appearing in comment 6: 
As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, access 
to the legal system, the administration of justice and the quality of service 
rendered by the legal profession.  As a member of a learned profession, a 
lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, 
employ that knowledge in reform of the law and work to strengthen legal 
education. . . .  Therefore, all lawyers should devote professional time and 
resources and use civic influence to ensure equal access to our system of 
justice for all those who because of economic or social barriers cannot 
afford or secure adequate legal counsel.165 
The same comment reminds lawyers of their allegiance to the lofty rule of 
law:  “In addition, a lawyer should further the public’s understanding of and 
confidence in the rule of law and the justice system because legal 
institutions in a constitutional democracy depend on popular participation 
and support to maintain their authority.”166 
The individual emphasis in the Rules grounded in the conceptions of 
client autonomy and self-interest, based on the professional ideology of the 
Standard Conception and captured in the Preamble is then reflected in many 
of the pertinent Rules, an emphasis that ill fits the representation of groups. 
1.  Competence 
Rule 1.1 defines competence to encompass “legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation.”167  The Rule’s focus is on legal knowhow.  Comment 1 
explains that,  
[i]n determining whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and 
skill in a particular matter, relevant factors include the relative complexity 
and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer’s general experience, the 
lawyer’s training and experience in the field in question . . . .  In many 
instances, the required proficiency is that of a general practitioner.168   
Comment 2 adds, “Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill consists of 
determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve” and 
comment 8, titled Maintaining Competence, states that “[t]o maintain the 
requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in 
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the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with 
relevant technology, engage in continuing study and education and comply 
with all continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is 
subject.”169  Nowhere does the rule or comments suggest the possible 
relevance of other aspects of competence, such as knowledge of tribal 
history, culture, and political organization. 
Legal competence is of course an important aspect of an effective 
attorney-client representation.  But the narrow legalistic focus of Rule 1.1, 
and its failure to even contemplate the inherent importance of cultural 
competence are lamentable, foreclosing analysis and even awareness of an 
important feature of representing groups such as tribes.  Proposed federal 
legislation to settle Navajo and Hopi claims on the Little Colorado River 
recently went down when grassroots Navajos protested concessions to a 
power plant and waiver of future claims.170  In a recent presentation, 
Navajo activist Nicole Horseherder attributed the Navajo president’s initial 
support for the legislation in part to a lack of understanding, by elected 
officials and tribal attorneys, of the cultural values of traditional Navajos.171  
Nothing in Rule 1.1 alerts a conscientious attorney to the relevance of 
cultural considerations as an aspect of competence.  In this sense, the 
legalistic emphasis of the rule obscures, and even excludes, inherently 
important aspects of the representation of tribes. 
The importance of competence about tribal culture, history, and political 
organization and their marginalization by the Rules were amplified by the 
fact that, until the “self-determination” era, tribal lawyers were mostly non-
Indians, outsiders to tribes.172  Indian law practitioners and scholars have 
long argued for increased attention to tribal values and culture in legal 
processes at every level.173  Pragmatically minded scholars have wondered 
about the typical lawyer’s competency in this regard.  In an interesting 
commentary, the late Professor Phil Frickey observed: 
[Scholars] have demonstrated that indigenous practices and values have 
influenced federal Indian law, and under a broader conception of the field, 
should influence it more substantially in the future.  But how can any 
transformation of the field occur when judges, cabined by the blinders of 
precedent, will dismiss such indigenous aspects as irrelevant, and when 
(largely non-Indian) scholars, though often sympathetic, will have 
difficulty identifying the Indian side of the story, much less integrating it 
into conceptual arguments for reform of the field.174 
Of course the prescient Frickey largely answered his own question, though 
the response to his rhetorical question is much clearer now with sixteen 
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years of hindsight.  One way to transform the field with indigenous 
perspectives is to rely on indigenous lawyers, who often do have the 
community ties, cultural knowledge, and worldviews that enable them to 
bridge Anglo-American and tribal law. 
Robert B. Porter once opined:   
 Suffice it to say, I cannot imagine a time when there has been a greater 
need for tribal lawyers. . . . 
 To fight these sovereignty battles, we need good, strong lawyers in the 
trenches—our sovereignty warriors. . . . 
. . . . 
 In my view, it is extremely important that more native people, 
especially those from reservation communities, enter the legal profession 
and become tribal lawyers. . . .  Native People have a knowledge of their 
community that no other person does.175 
To be clear, we are not suggesting that only Native Americans are 
competent to represent tribes, or that by virtue of being a Native American 
one is inherently better positioned to represent tribes.  Indeed, just as “[a] 
lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to 
handle legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar,” and a 
“lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through 
necessary study,”176 all lawyers may acquire the necessary cultural 
competence to represent tribes.  In particular, non-Indian attorneys or Indian 
attorneys who are representing a tribe other than their own may learn the 
relevant cultural knowhow to competently represent their clients.177  Our 
point is that nothing in Rule 1.1 suggests or alerts lawyers to that need, and 
the legalistic training and indoctrination of lawyers indeed discourages if 
not excludes the acquisition of such knowledge. 
Consider the late Navajo attorney and judge Claudeen Bates Arthur’s 
admonition to address difficult questions by envisioning the role of the 
lawyer though Navajo worldview.  That worldview can probably only be 
completely accessed by individuals who are brought up with that cultural 
training, have resided within the sacred homeland of the Navajos, and know 
their kinship relations through the Navajo clan system.  Today, the Navajo 
Nation Supreme Court has a choice of law rule dictating that the court must 
defer to Navajo law over state or federal law whenever possible.178  While 
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much of this law is available in codified written form, other Navajo law 
remains in the customary practices and oral tradition of the people.179  
Navajo attorneys and others who have become knowledgeable about 
Navajo law, culture, and community are likely to be the advocates with 
competence on these matters. 
It seems certain that many tribal lawyers grasp what is at stake for their 
clients and accept the responsibility to practice with respect for their 
cultures and traditions.  As Dale White has noted, “[W]e should always 
remember who is affected by our work.  Long after we attorneys have done 
our work, picked up our papers, closed up our briefcase, and gone home, 
the tribe and its members will still be there.  We must never forget that 
fact.”180  Indian lawyers, such as Raymond Cross, have articulated their 
understanding of such concepts as the wouncage, or Sacred Trust, “an 
expression of the communal reverence shown by the people of a tribe or 
community for the originating force that makes the wind, that brings the 
clouds, that carries the rain, that falls to the grass, that feeds the buffalo to 
nourish the man.”181  Tribal lawyers keeping such concepts in mind as an 
overarching discipline are potentially some of the strongest advocates for 
tribal communities, advocates who retain their connection to the 
community, able to step into the non-Indian legal and political world to 
effectively speak for the community. 
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Next, tribal leaders and scholars alike agree that some of the most 
important work in tribal lawyering is in the project of legal reform and 
institution building.  As Matthew Fletcher has argued, “[T]he days of 
making pie-in-the-sky arguments in federal court—and winning—are 
behind us.  There has to be another method of preserving and enhancing 
Indian and Indian tribal rights than pounding down the courthouse door.  It 
is these strategies that Indian lawyers can assist more than any others.”182  
In addition to their work “on the front lines” of major litigation, Fletcher 
argues, tribal lawyers are critically involved in “the development of tribal 
law and political structures.”183 
During the era of self-determination, tribes are reclaiming historic 
governing functions and updating them consistent with contemporary 
circumstances.184  Tribal lawyers may be deeply involved in constitutional 
reform, setting up court systems and drafting or revising tribal codes.  Many 
current needs directly reflect changes occurring in the self-determination 
era.  Since 1988, tribes have been able to contract with the federal 
government to administer their own federally funded hospitals, schools, and 
other programs.  They also may be eligible to assume increased regulatory 
powers over natural resources and environmental regulation within their 
reservations.185  As a result of the 2010 passage of the Tribal Law and 
Order Act, tribes are revising their criminal codes to provide for increased 
sentences and procedural safeguards for defendants.186 
To these institution-building tasks, tribal lawyers bring important skills 
of policy analysis, legislative drafting, constitutional and statutory 
interpretation, contract preparation, and so on.  Notably, however, these 
skills are precisely those that conventional legal education—focused on the 
case method—may be the least likely to address.  Moreover, as accounts of 
tribal constitutional reform suggest, much of the initiative draws from the 
will of the people as much as the input of legal professionals.187  Still, tribal 
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attorneys are likely to have more training in these skills than others in tribal 
government or communities, and will often be called on, for example, to 
assist in constitutional reform or tribal code drafting.188 
To be effective in tribal legal reform in an era of self-determination, 
tribal lawyers must be mindful of the relationship between tribal culture and 
government, and the ascendant norm of revitalizing tribal customary law for 
contemporary contexts.189  And it is here again that the lawyer’s 
competence, as defined by Rule 1.1, must include—but regrettably does not 
incorporate—not only facility with legal institution building but also 
knowledge about, and respect for, the particular tribal culture.  As the 
Pueblo lawyer and law professor Christine Zuni Cruz has put it, those who 
seek to work with tribal people must seek “cultural literacy,” including the 
ability to “critically analyze the social and political structures that inform 
. . . realities.”190  Given the interrelationship of law and culture,  
a grasp of indigenous knowledge systems, relationships, beliefs, 
expressions, values, and an understanding of one’s own as well the 
dominant cultural milieu (as they are at odds with or in sync with the 
culture one is working with) are important to cultural literacy. 
 At the heart of cultural literacy in respect to indigenous peoples is an 
understanding of indigenous knowledge.  Familiarity with the indigenous 
legal tradition, as an aspect of that knowledge, is important to lawyers 
involved in the representation of indigenous peoples and indigenous 
nations.  The link between indigenous legal tradition and the operation of 
law and justice within indigenous communities cannot be ignored in the 
internal practice of law, even if the fact that an indigenous legal tradition 
exists and is important to study has been ignored by most legal 
institutions in the country.  The identification of the indigenous legal 
tradition as one of the seven most important legal traditions of the world 
proves that not all, however, are blind to its importance and 
pervasiveness.191 
While Professor Zuni Cruz has written evocatively about the professional 
aspects of representing both individual and tribal clients,192 her words here 
have special resonance for the work of the tribal attorney in internal legal 
reform.193  Her comments also support current thinking in effective norms 
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of tribal governance, based as they are on the notion of congruency between 
traditional tribal culture and contemporary institutional organization. 
Political economists Joe Kalt and Stephen Cornell coined the term 
“cultural match” to describe a contemporary tribal government whose 
structure and values sufficiently correspond with traditional norms to make 
it functional.194  As a diagnostic tool, the concept of cultural match is very 
helpful in explaining why certain forms of government do not work for 
certain tribes—for example, a model of centralized government with a 
singular powerful head of state will often present problems for a tribe 
maintaining a tradition of decentralized, local leadership held by multiple 
family groups.  Even with this insight, however, it is difficult to turn to the 
challenge of what Kalt and Cornell call “nation building” or the actual work 
of building institutions that will simultaneously reflect the traditional values 
of tribes and function in a changing and modern society. 
It is precisely in this most sensitive of functions—the decolonization of 
tribal law and the reassertion of tribal culture—that tribal lawyers may 
bring the most to the table.  But how can they do it?  Several tribal lawyers 
and scholars provide some ideas.  Robert Porter, a Seneca lawyer and law 
professor who recently served as President of the Seneca Nation, and then 
joined an international law firm in New York,195 has long argued for tribal 
lawyers to revitalize tribal law consistent with tribal traditions.  As he 
writes:  “[T]ribal lawyers are in a critical position to influence the 
redeveloping of tribal sovereignty through the redevelopment of the tribal 
legal, governmental, and political infrastructure.  To me, tribal lawyers 
must be sovereignty warriors if the Indian nations are to survive.”196  As 
one might expect about the work of a “warrior,” the lawyer’s task is not 
easy here.  Porter explains, “While the tribal client must initiate efforts to 
revise and reform tribal societies, it is the tribal lawyer who usually does 
the heavy lifting in terms of effectuating the details of these initiatives.”197  
This heavy lifting requires the tribal lawyer to be particularly attentive to 
certain risks and in some ways to depart from conventional legal training. 
As Porter articulates: 
If the tribal lawyer does nothing other than, for example, borrow the state 
domestic relations law when drafting the tribal domestic relations law, the 
lawyer is doing nothing other than advising the tribe to replicate itself in 
the image of the dominant society. . . .  Because of the way lawyers are 
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trained, this mistake can be easily made.  Going to a book answer—a 
book of state laws—is what the Anglo-American-trained lawyers are 
taught.  Mindlessly borrowing state laws, especially laws governing social 
behavior, can, in my view, be the equivalent of the forced assimilation 
efforts to destroy tribal societies seen in the nineteenth century.  The 
difference here is that it is self-induced and perpetually reinforcing, rather 
than externally imposed.198 
To realize the potential of decolonization in the law reform process, Porter 
urges that: 
[T]ribal lawyers should have an added professional obligation to their 
clients, in addition to their advocating, counseling, and negotiation 
functions.  This obligation is the obligation to help heal the injustice and 
wrong-doing, the broken social, legal, political, and economic systems 
within our communities, and the injuries inflicted by colonization.199 
Such “added professional obligations” must include, we believe, a 
commitment to developing cultural competence and cultural literacy far 
greater than the legal competency imagined by Rule 1.1. 
If Porter identifies a key role for tribal lawyers in the process of 
institution building—counseling clients about decolonizing and healing 
measures in law reform—other scholars provide guidance about the 
underlying philosophical and substantive content of tribal law reform.  
Professor Duane Champagne notes that for many tribes, there will be 
resistance to any reform and changes may be modest.200  Traditional tribal 
governance may have severely eroded over the generations, such that it is 
not possible to recover it.201  Moreover, traditional institutions may not 
have the capacity or orientation to deal with the market economy or national 
polity.202  Indeed, as Keith Richotte points out, tribal advocates may not be 
serving their clients well if they project an irreconcilable conflict between 
“traditional” and “colonial” government.203  The modern reality of most 
tribes requires advocates to embrace legal pluralism and the possibility of 
multiple, contested meanings.204 
Some tribes will retain their existing constitutions or codes as a base and 
the lawyer may be constrained to suggesting the places where the tribe is 
able to make certain provisions more reflective of tribal culture, remove 
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federal influence, or simply to improve administration.205  Other tribes may 
attempt more comprehensive reform, for example through a constitutional 
convention,206 or the creation of new institutions such as Peacemaker 
Courts or Elders Council for dispute resolution and juvenile matters.  
Professors Matthew Fletcher and John Borrows have written about the 
challenges and opportunities of uncovering tribal customary law.207  Putting 
a fine point on the skill set, Justice Ray Austin of the Navajo Supreme 
Court writes: 
[T]here is a unique side to tribal court jurisprudence in the United States 
. . . [that] involves retrieving ancient tribal values, customs, and norms 
and using them to solve contemporary legal issues. . . .  The modern 
Navajo Nation courts are adept at this way of problem solving.  This 
method is itself a lesson embedded in the Navajo Creation Scripture and 
Journey Narratives.  These narratives are the Navajo people’s oral history 
beginning with the primeval universe.208 
Similarly, according to Claudeen Bates Arthur, the use of tribal customary 
law is key to survival as distinct peoples: 
I believe we must preserve the fundamental, internal essence of tribal 
identity.  Tribes must decide for themselves what is important for their 
survival as tribal people.  For the Navajo people, these are the 
fundamental philosophy and laws ordained by the Holy People, which are 
those concepts that remain unchanged despite the intrusions from outside 
and those things that were there when we came to our homeland between 
the four sacred mountains.209 
The question of how the tribal lawyer should help the tribe pursue 
cultural revitalization may seem to fall outside of the scope of Rule 1.1.  It 
may appear to be very “complicated,” Arthur wrote, “but if I react to this 
task as a Navajo person, as a Native thinker, the answer is simple.”210  The 
Navajo worldview orients along the four directions and provides guidance 
about how to approach each cycle of the day or of life, from origins in the 
east, to planning in the south, to living in the west, to hope, faith, and 
restoration in the north.  Having focused for so long on survival, the Navajo 
people, including their leaders, have not adequately moved into the 
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planning and execution phases—for example, in the preservation of 
sovereignty and culture.  Tribal lawyers here have a particular role to play.  
As Bates recounts: 
Many times lawyers for tribes take on roles of leadership because they are 
perceived as having knowledge.  And yes, they do have knowledge; they 
are trained in the ways of the outside world and can deal with external 
issues for tribes.  But lawyers are often asked to provide leadership on 
internal matters.  The word for “leader” in Navajo is Nataanii.  But the 
word means more than just leadership in political circles; the word 
embodies the idea that the person referenced is also a spiritual individual.  
Nataanii were individuals who had lived life and become wise.  They 
were people with integrity.  They had gone through the four-step process 
over and over again, around and around the circle, building each time on 
previous experience, and because of this could guide and plan for the 
survival of the community.  Therefore, Indian tribal lawyers, if they are 
truly to function as leaders of tribal governments, must be wise, spiritual 
people because tribes are depending upon them for their very survival.211 
One hopes, she writes, that they are “spiritual people of unquestioned 
integrity fully remembering the internal tribal concepts that are fundamental 
to the survival of the tribe.”212  Of course this prescription, as Arthur notes, 
goes straight to questions of identity and authority, issues that we discuss 
next. 
2.  Allocation of Authority Between Client and Attorney 
Rule 1.2(a) vests in clients, as opposed to lawyers, the sole authority to 
determine the goals of the representation.  The rule states in relevant part 
that, “a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives 
of representation.”213  The rule further empowers clients to participate in 
selecting the means by which their objectives are to be achieved, noting that 
[a lawyer] “shall consult with the client as to the means by which [goals] 
are to be pursued.”214  Comment 1 explains, “Paragraph (a) confers upon 
the client the ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by 
legal representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer’s 
professional obligations.”215 
Such lofty language, reflecting the emphasis of individual autonomy in 
lawyers’ professional ideology, is a far cry from common practice realities 
in the representation of tribes.  As scholars have suggested in their analysis 
of IRA approved governments, Rule 1.2 notwithstanding, it was the Crow 
and Hopi tribal lawyers who exercised enormous power over the tribes they 
represented, not the tribes who controlled the objectives or their lawyers.216  
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Similarly, in ICC litigation, tribes often believed they were pursuing the 
objective of land restitution, while their lawyers were filing claims for 
monetary remedies, a clear violation of Rule 1.2.217 
Moreover, the compounded effect of the interplay of various individually 
inspired rules is evident in the relationship of Rules 1.1 and 1.2 and their 
harmful impact for group clients.  The now-classic example of the 
usurpation of the Sioux Nation’s authority per Rule 1.2(a) in the litigation 
involving the Black Hills by lawyers who sought, and by a justice system 
that allowed for, damages rather than preservation of the sacred land was 
enabled by the definition of competency in Rule 1.1.  There, the lawyers 
seeking damages on behalf of the clients may have been legally competent, 
yet their failure to appreciate the admittedly complex, and perhaps even 
evolving, cultural and political norms of their clients led them to pursue a 
legal strategy that their clients’ ultimately perceived as disempowering and 
indeed devastating to their future as Lakota and Dakota peoples.218  
Consider comment 2 to Rule 1.2, which states in relevant part that: 
On occasion, however, a lawyer and a client may disagree about the 
means to be used to accomplish the client’s objectives.  Clients normally 
defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the 
means to be used to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect 
to technical, legal and tactical matters.219 
Client deference to the “special knowledge and skill of their lawyer” 
makes ample sense when the relevant knowledge in question is legal, but 
makes little sense when the relevant knowledge is cultural of which the 
lawyers are ignorant.  One might have expected the comment to instruct 
lawyers to defer to clients on such matters, but the comment unfortunately 
obscures and even forecloses analysis of this delicate issue.  It states, 
“Conversely, lawyers usually defer to the client regarding such questions as 
the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be 
adversely affected.”220  The very example given by the comment, deference 
to clients on issues of expenses to be incurred, is revealing:  it eliminates 
the space for a meaningful conversation about the actual goals of the 
clients. 
The risks of attorney paternalism, usurpation of clients’ authority, and 
factors of racial subordination and cultural misunderstanding that contribute 
to these problems are, of course, not unique to the representation of groups 
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such as tribes.221  A rich body of literature calls upon lawyers to engage in 
“client-centered” representation, listen and defer to clients’ actual goals and 
avoid imputing goals to clients they do not actually seek.222  Yet two unique 
features of group-representation are worth highlighting here.  First, calls for 
client-centered representation have sometimes, and increasingly so recently, 
been hijacked by advocates of zealous client autonomy and naked pursuit of 
self-interest.223  In the case of tribes, the risk is replacing one set of imputed 
goals—paternalistic goals determined by lawyers rather than clients—with 
another set of imputed goals—attributing to tribes the desire to pursue 
naked self-interest rather than objectives possibly shaped by different 
cultural norms. 
Second, the extent and gravity of usurping clients’ goals may be of a 
different and perhaps greater magnitude in the representation of groups such 
as tribes compared to the representation of individuals in other contexts.  
Lawyers engaged in the decolonization of tribal law and the reassertion of 
tribal culture, in self-determination projects of groups, and in institution 
building for people owe a special, particular duty to the people they 
represent.  As Professor Porter notes, exactly because of the power 
exercised by tribal lawyers effectuating the details of representation, 
lawyers must defer to the authority of their group-clients on such matters.  
Tribal lawyers, argues Porter, “should have an added professional 
obligation to their clients . . . to help heal the injustice and wrong-doing, the 
broken social, legal, political, and economic systems within our 
communities.”224 
Next, building on the near fetish of individualism and the exercise of 
autonomy by clients, Rule 1.2(b) complements Rule 1.2(a) by stating the 
nonaccountability principle:  “A lawyer’s representation of a client, 
including representation by appointment, does not constitute an 
endorsement of the client’s political, economic, social or moral views or 
activities.”225  Comment 5 adds that, “representing a client does not 
constitute approval of the client’s views or activities.”226  In the context of 
representing empowered individuals, Rule 1.2(b) conveys (more) sensibly 
that, because it is the client, and the client alone, who determines the goals 
of the representation, a lawyer is not morally or otherwise accountable for 
the objectives he or she helps the client pursue.  In the context of 
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representing groups such as tribes, however, Rule 1.2(b) is far from 
intuitive or inevitable.  Asserting moral distance from a client seems 
sensible and appropriate when the subject matter of representation is 
litigation or business negotiation.  It is not as compelling in the case of a 
lawyer who is engaged in helping clients pursue projects such as cultural 
revitalization.227 
Rule 1.2(c) appears at first relevant to mitigating these issues of moral 
distance and accountability.  It states that “[a] lawyer may limit the scope of 
the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances 
and the client gives informed consent.”228  The rule seems to allow tribal 
lawyers, especially outside counsel, to attempt to limit the scope of 
representation to a particular litigation or business transaction rather than to 
broader nation building and self-determination.  Yet while such a technical 
subsection may risk masking the complex true nature of representation of 
tribes, it cannot resolve the real challenges inherent in the representation.  
Even if a contemporary William Wirt could have written a limited scope 
representation clause into his retainer with the Cherokees in cases such as 
Cherokee Nation, such a clause would not and could not change the fact 
that by recognizing the power of the Supreme Court over tribes, the lawyer 
(and his client) has implicated not only the Cherokee Nation’s own moral, 
cultural, and sovereignty claims but also the claims of all other Indian tribes 
that may be bound by newly announced rules of Indian law. 
Indeed, Rule 1.2(c) seems to forbid such a use of the Rules.  The Rule 
itself conditions limited scope representation upon informed client consent, 
which tribes may very well refuse to grant in these circumstances.  
Moreover, comment 7 states that “although this Rule affords the lawyer and 
client substantial latitude to limit the representation, the limitation must be 
reasonable under the circumstances,” and adds that “[a]lthough an 
agreement for a limited representation does not exempt a lawyer from the 
duty to provide competent representation, the limitation is a factor to be 
considered when determining the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”229  The 
comment’s cross-reference to Rule 1.1 is ironic:  a limited scope 
representation would be a relevant factor in assessing a tribal lawyer’s 
competence if and only if Rule 1.1’s conception of competence included 
competence about tribal culture, history, and political organization.  It is 
difficult to imagine the tribal representation—even the most sophisticated 
financial lending arrangement, for example—that would not invoke, at least 
to some degree, these factors. 
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3.  Conflicts of Interest 
Rule 1.7 aims to protect attorney loyalty to clients by forbidding lawyers 
from representing clients when the attorney-client relationship is tainted by 
a conflict of interest.  Rule 1.7(a) states that a “lawyer shall not represent a 
client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest,” and 
goes on to define a “concurrent conflict of interest” in terms of “directly 
adverse” clients,230 or in circumstances in which the representation of one 
client gives rise to “a significant risk” of a “material[] limit[ation]” 
regarding the representation of another client, “a former client or a third 
person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.”231  Rule 1.8 applies the 
conflict rule in common fact patterns,232 and Rule 1.9 defines and forbids 
conflicts vis-à-vis former clients.233  If a conflict of interest arises, the Rules 
generally allow a client to cure the defect by giving informed consent to the 
conflict.234  Comment 1 explains, “Loyalty and independent judgment are 
essential elements in the lawyer’s relationship to a client,” and comment 6 
adds that  
[t]he client as to whom the representation is directly adverse is likely to 
feel betrayed, and the resulting damage to the client-lawyer relationship is 
likely to impair the lawyer’s ability to represent the client effectively.  In 
addition, the client on whose behalf the adverse representation is 
undertaken reasonably may fear that the lawyer will pursue that client’s 
case less effectively out of deference to the other client, i.e., that the 
representation may be materially limited by the lawyer’s interest in 
retaining the current client. 
Yet the Rules only demand that lawyers avoid legal conflicts of interest 
as defined by Rules 1.7–1.9 and do not preclude representations tainted by 
other types of conflicts.  For example, comment 6 states that:  “On the other 
hand, simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose 
interests are only economically adverse, such as representation of 
competing economic enterprises in unrelated litigation, does not ordinarily 
constitute a conflict of interest . . . ,”235 and comment 24 generally allows 
lawyers to represent clients with positional and ideological conflicts of 
interest, stating that a lawyer may 
take inconsistent legal positions in different tribunals at different times on 
behalf of different clients.  The mere fact that advocating a legal position 
on behalf of one client might create precedent adverse to the interests of a 
client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter does not create a 
conflict of interest.236 
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The Rules’ defense of attorney loyalty to clients in terms of disallowing 
representations tainted by legal conflicts of interest affords group clients— 
tribes included—some protection, although the narrow reach of the Rules 
did not preclude the non-Indian lawyers for the Sioux Nation from 
collecting their contingency fees while their clients remained poor and 
dissatisfied with the resolution of the case.237 
More importantly, however, the Rules’ focus on legal conflicts to the 
exclusion of positional, ideological, or other types of conflicts obscures 
some important questions related to the representation of tribes.  As 
S. James Anaya wrote with respect to his work in Nevada v. Hicks, tribal 
lawyers face a number of challenging conflicts questions in tribal 
representation.238  As Anaya put it, “[H]ow do we advise our Indian or 
tribal clients when we see Federal Indian Law, which was once understood 
to be a friendly body of doctrine, being emasculated by the federal courts to 
the detriment of tribal interests?”239  There are a number of specific 
implications of this problem, which go to questions of client goals and 
identity under Rules 1.2 and 1.7. 
First, what to do when the tribal client expects and deserves his day in 
court, but the lawyer knows that the case, if it ends up in the Supreme 
Court, has a 70 to 80 percent chance of losing (or worse)?240  Should the 
tribal attorney counsel his client to expend precious resources on the very 
slim chance of vindicating tribal sovereignty and property?  Second, and 
relatedly, should the attorney counsel the client about the ramifications for 
other tribes?  In each of the Supreme Court’s recent jurisdiction cases, the 
situation for the tribes has gotten progressively worse, and the tribal lawyer 
can now probably predict that his client’s interests may set a precedent with 
harmful results for the other 565 tribes.  How, if at all, should that 
information affect the lawyer’s advice about strategy?  Third, what should 
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the tribal lawyer do when the “best” precedents—often, in jurisdiction 
cases, the Supreme Court’s historic decisions in Cherokee Nation and 
Worcester—are cloaked in racist language and discriminatory reasoning 
now abhorrent to the tribal client and indeed most of American society?  
Or, as Anaya put it, how should the lawyer assess the “difficult choices 
presented by the effort to advance tribal interests within a body of law that 
rests on problematic, if not illegitimate, doctrinal tenets”?241  These already 
complex challenges are further complicated by the fact that tribal clients are 
not insulated from the dominant culture of aggressive individualism and 
narrow pursuit of self-interest, let alone America’s love affair with 
litigation, such that a tribal attorney who does bring these issues to the 
attention of clients may be dismissed or ignored. 
Rule 1.7, to be sure, offers some limited guidance regarding these 
questions.  In assessing whether positional conflicts amount to prohibited 
legal conflicts of interest, comment 24 to Rule 1.7 states:  
Factors relevant in determining whether the clients need to be advised of 
the risk include:  where the cases are pending, whether the issue is 
substantive or procedural, the temporal relationship between the matters, 
the significance of the issue to the immediate and long-term interests of 
the clients involved and the clients’ reasonable expectations in retaining 
the lawyer.242 
Note, however, that a tribal lawyer would only be prohibited from 
representing conflicting interests pursuant to comment 24 if both tribes 
were current clients, and even then the “significance of the issue to the 
immediate and long-term interests of the clients involved” would be but 
“relevant factors.”  Similarly, comment 26 notes that 
conflicts of interest . . . arise in contexts other than litigation . . . [and] 
[r]elevant factors in determining whether there is significant potential for 
material limitation include the duration and intimacy of the lawyer’s 
relationship with the client or clients involved, the functions being 
performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that disagreements will arise and 
the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict.  The question is often 
one of proximity and degree.243 
The analysis is instructive but limited in scope:  it directs a lawyer’s 
attention only to current representations of clients and focuses on the 
likelihood of legal disagreements. 
Our concern with Rule 1.7 as it pertains to the representation of tribes is 
that it may lead lawyers to a quick resolution that no conflict limits their 
representation of tribes, and worse will foreclose the space for any 
meaningful discussion of the impact of litigation strategy and precedent on 
other tribes for the formalistic and unpersuasive reason that such other 
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tribes are not the lawyer’s client.  Moreover, nothing in the Rules’ approach 
even suggests analysis of the impact on future tribal generations or the 
impact on culture, tradition, or relationships.  Tribal advocacy 
organizations, such as the Native American Rights Fund and National 
Congress of American Indians, have developed programs to track Indian 
law cases and provide strategic advice including the likelihood of success, 
impacts on other tribes, and framing of the claims—with an eye to assisting 
in particular cases and preserving tribal sovereignty more broadly.244  Yet 
there is little in the Rules to guide such efforts. 
Consider litigation settlement.  Settlement often requires tribes to 
compromise on some of the rights and values held most dearly by the tribal 
membership.  As Susan Williams has written about in her work on water 
law settlements, there may well be constituencies among the tribe for whom 
water is a sacred element whose value transcends quantification or 
distribution in property terms.245  In land claims and treaty cases, rights 
promised by the United States generations ago have often motivated tribal 
advocacy for generations and there can be a real loss—culturally and 
politically—associated with relinquishing historical claims.246  For all of 
these reasons, the tribal attorney may find it challenging to counsel his or 
her clients about settling major claims—challenges about which Rule 1.7 
and its legalistic approach to conflicts are silent. 
Implementation of settlements can also be difficult.  A much-heralded 
example of successful tribal-federal negotiation is in the recent resolution of 
claims that the Department of the Interior had mismanaged tribal trust fund 
accounts going back to the allotment era.247  The United States agreed to 
pay forty-two tribes over one billion dollars to resolve these claims.  
Individual tribes, some of which were represented by individual counsel 
and others by NARF, received major monetary awards.  These settlements 
brought some closure on claims that had been a major stain on the federal-
tribal relationship and some vindication for the tribes that had been raising 
the issue for so long.  But when those awards reached the tribal 
communities, questions arose about how to use the money.  Some tribal 
leaders who tried to implement tribal values about collective welfare and 
planning for future generations lost their jobs, or were pressured to release 
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the funds on a per capita basis to individuals.248  Tribal attorneys may find 
themselves caught in the middle.249  In addition to the upheaval in certain 
tribes, the trust fund settlement has also inspired a dispute over fees among 
tribal lawyers who represented tribes at various stages in the litigation.250  
Yet, difficulties in implementation and postsettlement fees do not obscure 
the fact that tribal attorneys achieved a victory of monumental proportions 
in the tribal trust fund cases.  Despite the limits of the U.S. legal system in 
providing real justice or healing for Indian people, tribal lawyers continue 
to push in this direction, often heroically so. 
Or consider the increased involvement of tribes in business dealings to 
raise revenues for essential governmental functions like police and safety 
services, administration, and regulation.251  While in-house tribal counsel 
may engineer and execute these deals, it is also true that tribes sometimes 
hire outside counsel, particularly for complex lending and financial matters.  
At least two major sets of ethical issues arise in these kinds of dealings, 
both of which evoke the issue of client “loyalty” not envisioned or 
addressed by the conflict rules.  In the first instance, tribal attorneys are 
under considerable pressure to structure tribal law and contracts in a way 
that both attracts outside investment and respects internal norms.  Tribal 
codes are often not well developed, and this kind of work may be a 
threshold requirement, pushed by tribal leaders and outside business 
partners alike.  In the rush to create an environment conducive to business, 
tribes may adopt foreign commercial codes without sufficient attention to 
existing law or tribal values.252   
In contract negotiations, moreover, investors and other partners often 
want tribes to waive their sovereign immunity as a condition of the 
transaction, and the tribal attorney must guide her client through these 
nuanced considerations.  On the one hand, the waiver of sovereign 
immunity can be difficult or unappealing for tribal members concerned 
about the limited resources and survival of the tribe itself,253 and on the 
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other hand, the decision to grant a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity is 
itself a sovereign act,254 and one practiced by state and federal governments 
on a regular basis.  
Other lawyers sometimes struggle with questions about the impact of 
dispute resolution and precedent on nonparty group members who may be 
similarly situated.  Cause lawyers, for example, often worry about strategic 
selection of cases for litigation and about the filing of a case by an 
individual that may be inconsistent with the cause.  Like tribal lawyers, 
however, the experience of cause lawyers, who after all inherently represent 
causes rather than individuals, serves to demonstrate the shortcomings of 
the conflicts rules and the exclusionary force of the narrow scope in terms 
of not providing an arena in which important questions about the 
representation of groups may be aired.255  Wouncage—Sacred Trust256—
may not be appropriate in all tribal attorney-client relationships, but 
conflicts of interest rules that increasingly deem wouncage a foreign 
inconceivable concept ill fit group representation, tribes included. 
4.  Organization As Client 
Rule 1.13 is the only instance in which the Rules acknowledge and 
attempt to address clients that are not individuals.  Subsection 1.13(a) states 
that “[a] lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the 
organization acting through its duly authorized constituents,”257 but not 
these constituencies.  But of course, comment 1 acknowledges, “[a]n 
organizational client . . . cannot act except through its officers, directors, 
employees, shareholders and other constituents,”258 and, therefore, a lawyer 
for an organization will practically represent the organizational client by 
dealing with its constituencies, which in turn may confuse the 
constituencies as to whom the lawyer represents.  “In dealing with an 
organization’s directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or 
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other constituents,” subsection 1.13(f) states that “a lawyer shall explain the 
identity of the client [the organization] when the lawyer knows or 
reasonably should know that the organization’s interests are adverse to 
those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.”259 
While Rule 1.13 primarily contemplates corporate organizations,260 it is 
intended to guide the practice of lawyers who represent clients who are not 
individuals.  Comment 9, for example, states that “the duty defined in this 
Rule applies to governmental organizations.”261  Yet applying Rule 1.13 to 
organizations other than corporations is easier said than done.  In the 
context of corporate clients, the application of subsection 1.13(a)—a 
corporate lawyer represents the corporation, not its various constituencies 
such as the board of directors, the officers, the employees, or the 
shareholders—makes ample sense because of two features of the corporate 
entity.  First, American corporate law defines the only purpose of a for-
profit corporation to be profit maximization on behalf of shareholders.  
Thus, practically speaking, stating that a corporate lawyer represents the 
corporation means that the corporate lawyer’s clear and only role is to help 
the corporation pursue profit maximization, and the only remaining 
question is who is authorized to speak and act for the corporation in pursuit 
of this one goal.  Second, American corporate governance law specifies a 
clear corporate hierarchy, such that a corporate lawyer knows exactly who 
is authorized to speak and act for the corporate client.  Indeed, it is exactly 
this very hierarchy that subsections 1.13(b) and 1.13(c) rely on in 
specifying the duties of the organizational lawyer in going up the corporate 
ladder.262 
Outside the corporate context, however, Rule 1.13 loses much of its 
guiding force.  To begin with, without the simplistic definition of the 
corporate entity and its only permissible profit maximizing goal, stating that 
a lawyer represent the organization and not its constituencies simply serves 
to highlight the question of what it means to represent an organization.  
Consider the governmental lawyer.  Comment 9 acknowledges that: 
Defining precisely the identity of the client and prescribing the resulting 
obligations of such lawyers may be more difficult in the government 
context and is a matter beyond the scope of these Rules.  Although in 
some circumstances the client may be a specific agency, it may also be a 
branch of government, such as the executive branch, or the government as 
a whole. . . .  Thus, when the client is a governmental organization, a 
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different balance may be appropriate between maintaining confidentiality 
and assuring that the wrongful act is prevented or rectified, for public 
business is involved.263 
Next, many noncorporate organizations lack the clear hierarchy of 
corporations, or for that matter, lack any hierarchy at all.  In such 
circumstances, the issue of who is authorized to speak and act on behalf of 
the organization becomes a complicated and complex affair. 
Attempting to apply Rule 1.13 to tribal lawyers exemplifies the confusion 
the Rules may cause.  A straightforward and commonly accepted 
application of subsection 1.13(a) suggests that a tribal attorney represents 
the tribe, and not its constituencies, such as the tribal president, chief or 
chair, the legislative counsel or other leaders, or tribal members.  So far, so 
good.  But what does it mean to represent the tribe?  Unlike a corporation, a 
tribe does not have one simple goal such as profit maximization, but a 
complex array of possibly conflicting objectives and goals.  Moreover, in 
the corporate sphere, not only does a clear hierarchy exist, but decisions 
made by the authorized constituencies are insulated from scrutiny by the 
business judgment rule.264  Accordingly, a corporate lawyer need only 
identify the authorized constituency pursuant to the hierarchal structure and 
then usually simply follow the instructions given by the constituent, without 
having to worry about the legitimacy of the instructions.  But in the case of 
tribes, the existence of a hierarchal structure may fail to account for other 
constituencies or representatives of the tribe—a classic example being that 
religious elders or medicine people may be better situated than elected tribal 
leaders to handle sacred sites or repatriation matters.  In short, the 
representation of tribes often entails complex questions regarding what it 
means to represent a tribe and who is authorized to speak and act on behalf 
of the tribe, questions that a mechanical application of Rule 1.13 simply 
cannot resolve. 
Consider subsection 1.13(g): 
A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its 
directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other 
constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7.  If the organization’s 
consent to the dual representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent 
shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the 
individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders.265 
The Rule makes sense in the corporate context.  If, for example, the chief 
executive officer wishes to have the corporate attorney represent her, the 
“appropriate official,” here the board of directors, will give its informed 
consent on behalf of the entity or, if the board wishes to be represented by 
the corporate attorney, a majority of independent board members will give 
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its informed consent.266  But what if the tribal president asks the tribal 
attorney to represent him?  It is not always clear who can give informed 
consent to the representation in the spirit of Rule 1.13(g). 
IV.  THE EXPERIENCE OF AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAWYERS AS A 
MEANS OF QUESTIONING LAWYERING FOR GROUPS 
In a thought-provoking article, Phyllis Bernard asks whether the Rules 
and the role-morality they embody serve as a suitable foundation for 
lawyers engaged in tribal peacemaking.267  Bernard’s inquiry can be 
generalized to encompass questioning whether the Standard Conception and 
the Rules serve as a useful and legitimate basis for understanding the role 
and practices of Native American lawyers, and indeed group lawyers more 
generally.  Bernard argues that the basic model of legal ethics is premised 
on “an overriding ethical obligation to protect her client’s individual 
rights—at all costs—against encroachment by the values of the 
community.”268  This “individualistic paradigm,” in which the lawyer’s role 
is one of a “champion of individual’s rights,”269 may be inconsistent with 
the vision of the role of lawyers representing tribes and committed to tribal 
peacemaking because the fundamental unit, or client, is not an individual 
but a group—a tribe and its values.  Bernard then explores whether moving 
away from the individual client as a constitutive feature of understanding 
the lawyer’s role is consistent with the dominant professional ideology and 
the Rules. 
Bernard, of course, is not alone in questioning the fit of the 
individualistic dominant Standard Conception and the Rules that codify it 
as the professional baseline for lawyers representing groups.  Scholars and 
practitioners representing groups, ranging from governmental attorneys, 
cause lawyers, public interest, and community lawyers to class action and 
corporate lawyers, have long argued that the Standard Conception and the 
Rules that give life to it ill fit their practices.  Geoff Hazard, for example, 
has noted that “[m]any of the discussions regarding ethics of government 
lawyers proceed from the premise that the client-lawyer relationship 
between government lawyers and government entities is ‘different’ from the 
counterpart relationship in private practice,”270 and another commentator 
opined that  
[t]raditional approaches to the responsibilities of government lawyers 
have failed to provide a robust framework for analyzing the question of 
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how government lawyers should exercise their discretion. . . .  [T]his 
failure is a result of an attempt to apply a model of legal ethics that is ill-
suited to the unique role of government attorneys.271  
Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold, leading authorities on cause lawyering, 
have observed that within the traditional ideological and regulatory 
framework, cause lawyers are a “deviant strain” of the profession,272 and 
Shauna Marshall has noted that the community lawyering model “departs 
from the traditional focus of a lawyer’s work—representing an individual 
client.”273  Even securities lawyers have been challenged to abandon the 
Standard Conception and act as gatekeepers in the public interest.274 
Thirteen years after the publication of his pioneering Should Trees Have 
Standing?  Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects,275 Christopher Stone 
revisited his thesis and explained that rather than intending to focus on trees 
and other natural objects, his goal was to explore the representation of all 
“disinterested entities” defined as “various sorts of . . . membership sets,” 
including tribes, nations and corporations,276 and question whether even if 
we can “fit [disinterested entities] into the legal framework . . . ought we do 
so?”277  Similarly, we question the need to fit group lawyers, tribal lawyers 
included, into the standard legal framework of lawyering. “What I am 
suggesting is the validity of, and not merely recognizing the convention of, 
moral discourses that map membership entities, and consider them 
according to their own governance,”278 added Stone, and, “by ‘validity’ I 
mean that such discourses are capable of adding to, rather than, as 
reductionism has it, distracting from, the insight and direction which our 
moral lives require.”279  Stone concludes by arguing that “the position I am 
advancing is not disregardful of axioms or principles, but is skeptical of the 
single-minded stress on them.”280 
Following Stone, our point here is not to wholly discredit the Standard 
Conception or the Rules.  It should be acknowledged that some 
commentators do believe that the Rules fit and should apply to group 
lawyers,281 and many tribal lawyers and clients rely on the Rules to useful 
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effect.  Rather, like other scholars of group lawyering, we wish to question 
the wisdom of accepting the Standard Conception and the Rules as both the 
start and finish point for understanding and assessing the conduct of group 
lawyers and to argue that the experiences of tribal lawyers suggest that a 
reductive adherence to the Rules may be unhelpful and even harmful for 
group lawyers and their clients.  Just as Stone “would displace the quest for 
a single, all-encompassing framework, pretentious to govern all moral 
thought, with an effort to develop different planes, each appropriate to 
separate moral activities,”282 we argue that treating the individualistic 
Standard Conception and the Rules that follow it as a single all-
encompassing framework for assessing the conduct of lawyers is a mistake.  
Instead, like Stone, we believe that the experiences of tribal attorneys 
amount to “different planes” of legal ethics that allow for “the role of 
imagination in the development of ethical capacities.”283 
The lessons that emerge from our analysis of tribal lawyering are broader 
than simply identifying a list of potential revisions to particular Rules, such 
as the rewriting of the concept of competence in Rule 1.1 to include 
meaningful references to cultural, historical, and political knowhow and 
literacy (although this would be desirable).  Rather, the insights that emerge 
speak to the need to create a space for competing diverse visions and 
professional ideologies to emerge alongside the dominant ideology of the 
Standard Conception—ideologies that will in turn inform and shape the 
Rules and the role of lawyers for both groups and individuals.  In the next 
sections we outline a few such possible visions and then share examples of 
Indian tribal and organizational codes and statements that reflect these 
visions. 
A.  From “Zealous Advocacy” to “Effective Representation” 
Zealous advocacy reflects the individualistic impulse of the basic model.  
It assumes an individual client who establishes clear objectives and seeks to 
pursue them either in an adversarial fashion in litigation or aggressively 
across the negotiation table.  It further assumes both that clients will be best 
served by zeal and that lawyers’ main role is advocacy vis-à-vis an 
opposing party.  And indeed, for many individual clients and some group 
clients, zealous advocacy is the very essence of effective representation.  
But zealous advocacy is simply not a broad enough category to encompass 
the range of needs for all clients, especially group clients. 
Gary Bellow, reflecting on the meaning of effective representation as a 
political attorney for groups, concisely captured the limitations of zealous 
advocacy reduced to adversarial aggressive litigation:   
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In some of the efforts, we sought rule changes or injunctive relief against 
particular practice on behalf of an identified class. . . .  Some strategies 
were carried out in the courts.  At other times we ignored litigation 
entirely in favor of bureaucratic maneuvering and community and union 
organizing.  Even when pursuing litigation, we often placed far greater 
emphasis on mobilizing and educating clients, or strengthening the 
entities and organizations that represented then, than on judicial 
outcomes.284 
Importantly Bellow notes, “always, we employed the lawsuit . . . as a 
vehicle for gathering information, positioning adversaries, asserting 
bargaining leverage, and adding to the continuing process of definition and 
designation that occurs in any conflict.”285  It is not that group lawyering is 
inconsistent with aggressive litigation; rather, group lawyers ought not 
come to understand zealous advocacy as consisting first, foremost, and 
perhaps of nothing more than aggressive litigation.  Such a narrow 
approach risks misunderstanding and even betraying the goals of group 
clients and the role of lawyers for them. 
The same insight emerges from the experiences of government lawyers:  
“The conventional wisdom, however, suggests that zealous representation 
of clients is inappropriate for government lawyers.  Most lawyers and 
judges who have considered the ethical responsibilities of the government 
lawyer have assumed that government counsel should temper their 
advocacy in the interests of ‘justice.’”286  Such tempered zeal is warranted 
notwithstanding the fact that government lawyers wish to win cases they 
litigate and is justified given the boarder goals of the government lawyers 
and her client—the government—to seek justice.287 
Consider Robert Porter’s work on the meaning of indigenous national 
sovereignty.  Professor Porter argues that lawyers have usurped the 
authority of tribes and have advanced an Americanized notion of 
sovereignty causing tribes a significant harm.  In some instances, Porter 
notes, lawyers’ advice to the Seneca Nation was “more insidiously 
transformative than any edict emanating from the mouth of some BIA 
official” and “there was simply no way for our former president to know 
that this attorney was destroying his own uniquely Seneca conception of 
sovereignty by passing on as gospel the anti-Indian sovereignty views of the 
United States Supreme Court.”288 
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As this example potentially suggests, sometimes an important aspect of 
group representation entails not external needs vis-à-vis opposing parties 
but rather internal needs of building identity and group relations.  For such 
groups, effective representation might require, at times, not narrow zealous 
advocacy but tentative and mindful facilitation.  A group lawyer in these 
circumstances might better serve her clients by abandoning warm zeal, 
aggression, and a combative posture and replacing them with what Deborah 
Cantrell, writing about lawyers and social change, calls “an approach of 
curiosity,”289 fostering not the naked pursuit of individualistic self-interest 
but representation in the spirit of building webs of relationships within 
groups and vis-à-vis others.290 
With the benefit of Cantrell’s insights, one might reimagine the 
conversation between a tribal nation and its lawyers.291  Rather than merely 
advising the client about the Supreme Court’s view of Indian rights (and the 
likelihood of losing most cases), the lawyer might listen carefully to the 
tribal leaders’ description of the interests and goals associated with rights 
claims, and then advise the client accordingly.  As one example, the 
Onondaga Nation of New York is working with its lawyers to resolve 
historic land claims, but rather than focus purely on tribal rights, it has 
identified objectives including the clean-up of local natural resources and 
restoration of relationships with non-Indian neighbors.  At the insistence of 
tribal leaders, the Onondaga land-claim complaint drafted by attorneys Joe 
Heath and Curtis Berkey calls for “healing of the land and water . . . with all 
people who live within the Onondaga original territory.”292  While still 
pursuing litigation, the Onondaga Nation’s lawyers are working on a 
strategy that includes community meetings, relationship building, and a 
discussion of shared interests. 
To reiterate, we are not questioning the appropriateness of zealous 
advocacy in all instances.  Some tribes may want to pursue the most 
aggressive litigation or transactional strategy available, and given their 
history of oppression and dispossession, they may well be entitled, if not 
necessarily likely to prevail in today’s courts.  But some tribes may want to 
take a different approach.  In this regard, we are mindful of the powerful 
work of Aziz Rana, who has suggested an ethic of “democratic lawyering” 
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in which the lawyer works on the “creation of processes for participatory 
citizenship as a potential solution to class disagreement.”293  Therefore, we 
question a single-minded emphasis on zealous advocacy as the obvious 
baseline for all lawyers, group lawyers included.  We are suggesting that 
such an all-encompassing framework may at times be inconsistent with the 
effective representation of clients and worse, suppress imaginative 
alternatives to effective group lawyering.  Our analysis suggests some of 
these alternatives.  In lieu of narrow-minded zeal reduced to aggressive 
litigation, all lawyers but especially group lawyers, need to be curious, 
open-minded, and knowledgeable about other approaches to effectively 
representing clients.294 
Next, group lawyers, even when Rule 1.13 allows them to identify who is 
authorized to speak on behalf of the group, ought not show too great a 
deference to the authorized constituency, especially in representing what 
Paul Tremblay has called “loosely-structured groups.”295  Warm zeal and 
great deference to clients are certainly often justified, especially in the 
representation of individual clients.  But reductive zeal, when combined 
with strong deference to clients, might be counterproductive—even 
harmful—in the context of group clients.  Writing about community 
lawyers, Tremblay compellingly argues that, “[j]ust as powerless group 
members ought not to be dominated by the professional lawyers in suits, it 
is similarly true . . . that powerless group members ought not be dominated 
by the more vocal and educated leaders within the community.”296  This 
insight rings true in the representation of tribes as well as other group 
clients:  “To the extent that corporate law principles applied to the . . . 
group setting require the lawyer to honor the instructions of the entity’s 
‘duly authorized constituents,’ the paradigmatic counseling responsibility of 
a . . . group lawyer might serve to ‘reproduce hierarchy,’ even when the 
lawyer adopts [a] respectful and humble posture.”297 
Finally, letting go of a reductive construction of “zealous advocacy” 
might open the door to better, broader education for group lawyers in 
appropriate circumstances.  Here, we mean more than the important 
recognition of the shortcomings of too narrow a reading of competency per 
Rule 1.1, and its expansion to include the notions of cultural competency 
and literacy.  We mean to evoke, following Tony Alfieri, the notions of 
pedagogy of community and public citizenship, as well as mindfulness of 
group identity and spirituality.298 
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B.  From “Nonaccountability” to “Client Empowerment” 
The principle of nonaccountability reflects a commitment to honor the 
autonomy and decision-making authority of individual clients.  It signifies 
the deference of lawyers-agents to clients-principals.  Exactly because 
clients alone are exercising their autonomy and determine the objectives of 
the relationship, lawyers are nonaccountable for the goals they help bring 
about.  But for some individual clients and many group clients, lawyers 
simply do not play the role of mere agents.  Rather, lawyers take a more 
proactive role in designing and participating in determining the goals of the 
representation.  In such circumstances, respect and pursuit of client 
empowerment simply does not require nonaccountability and may in fact 
demand lawyer accountability. 
Cause lawyers, in contrast to the Standard Conception, are anything but 
nonaccountable.  In fact,  
[l]awyering is for them attractive precisely because it is a deeply moral or 
political activity, a kind of work that encourages pursuit of their vision of 
the right, the good, or the just.  Cause lawyers have something to believe 
in and bring their beliefs to bear on their work lives.299 
As noted by Gary Bellow, “[w]e were not detached professionals offering 
advice and representation regardless of consequences; we saw ourselves 
responsible for, and committed to, shaping those consequences.”300  
Similarly, a government lawyer, while “adopting as central the duties of 
loyalty, zeal, and confidentiality, puts relatively greater emphasis on the 
duties of the lawyer to the court and to innocent third parties”;301 that is, she 
feels accountable for the outcomes she helps bring about. 
In turn, lawyers’ accountability to the causes of their clients raises a well-
explored concern about attorneys’ usurpation of clients’ autonomy and 
power in the attorney-client relationship.302  Accountability to clients when 
lawyers believe in, and have a stake and an interest in, the outcome of the 
representations, is a serious concern experienced by many group lawyers 
and their clients, from cause lawyers303 to class action attorneys.304 
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Moreover, as Deborah Cantrell thoughtfully points out, “hyper-loyalty” to 
clients and their objectives entails serious risks beyond usurping clients’ 
autonomy.  Hyper-loyalty is dangerous and could become inconsistent with 
effective representation because it limits the range of strategies, 
relationships, and solutions group lawyers might entertain with an open 
mind on behalf of clients.305 
As was the case with zealous advocacy, we do not wish to wholly 
undermine nonaccountability nor to belittle the challenges associated with 
lawyers’ accountability for clients’ goals.  We do, however, believe that the 
experiences of tribal lawyers and other group lawyers highlight the 
shortcomings of strict adherence to the principle of nonaccountability as the 
benchmark for attorney professionalism.  Instead, we want to suggest client 
empowerment as a boarder principle that is inclusive of traditional 
nonaccountability in appropriate circumstances as well as of lawyer 
accountability in other instances. 
By client empowerment we do not mean merely the avoidance of 
paternalism by lawyers vis-à-vis clients in the client-centered representation 
tradition,306 nor do we ignore the inherent risk of disempowering clients by 
the very exercise of lawyers’ accountability to clients’ objectives.  As we 
have seen, imputing goals to clients and treating clients paternalistically is 
not a new charge leveled against lawyers.307  Rather, by empowerment of 
clients we mean “the promise to unite client/community autonomy with 
systemic reform so that community members become the authors of their 
own stories and the agents of their own change,”308 a process that takes 
enabling, promoting, and respecting group decision making as its goals.309  
It is, admittedly, a risky process that acknowledges the dangers of lawyers’ 
accountability, usurpation of clients’ autonomy and power, and hyper-
loyalty.  But it is a necessary risk, especially in lawyering for loose groups, 
a context in which lawyers “are not simply carriers of a cause but are at the 
same time those who shape it, name it and voice it,”310 exactly because of 
the loose nature of decision making and exercise of authority within the 
group.311 
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Porter, for example, is specific in his view of what is required of tribal 
lawyers:  “The attorney representing an Indigenous nation has just as much 
an obligation to advise his or her client of that nation’s views of its own 
sovereignty as it does the American view.”  Viewed in this light, Porter’s 
statement that “I teach [students] the truth about America’s agenda to 
destroy the Indian nations and how they, as American trained lawyers, can 
use their skills to rebuild their own nations in the image of their own 
people”312 sounds like a call to embrace not partisan zealous advocacy and 
nonaccountability but instead effective representation and client 
empowerment. 
A move away from a narrow conception of nonaccountability in 
appropriate circumstances might allow group lawyers to better serve their 
clients.  Consider, once again, the Rules’ approach to conflict of interests, 
and, in particular, to positional and ideological conflicts.  In the context of 
representing individuals and some entity clients, the Rules’ narrow 
construction of conflicts may be quite sensible; moreover, it probably 
reflects the practice and business realities of many law firms, large and 
small.  Indeed, some have called for further narrowing Rules on conflicts to 
better reflect the demands of the market for legal services.313   
Consider, for example, the situation of commercial law firms whose 
experience in complex transactions on Indian reservations yields 
opportunities to represent both tribes and non-Indian investors.  Even 
lawyers deeply committed to tribal sovereignty as a general matter can find 
themselves challenging it if they represent a non-Indian party in a deal that 
falls apart, much to the chagrin of some tribal clients who expect “their” 
lawyers to defend tribal jurisdiction, immunity, and sovereignty more 
broadly.  Tribes may face similar questions when they assess the loyalty of 
lobbyists or litigators who represent tribes on certain matters and advocate 
against them in others.  At an even finer grain, some tribes will not 
appreciate it when an attorney moves from representing one tribe to 
another. 
Of course this concern is not unique to Indian tribes as clients.  Lawyers 
may face similar pressures to advocate consistently with a certain position 
in everything from employment litigation to intellectual property rights.  
Moreover, from the client’s perspective, it may be wise to take stock of the 
fact that the law firm lawyer is likely to have a broader set of potential 
conflicts and loyalty issues than the in-house lawyer.  Moreover, the fact 
that some clients have greater expectations of attorney loyalty to the group, 
industry, or cause does not mean, of course, that a group and its lawyers 
cannot mutually agree on a more narrowly tailored duty of loyalty.  It does 
mean, however, that lawyers would be well served to acknowledge the 
different loyalty expectations of different clients.  Perhaps, as Tracy Zlock 
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suggests in the Indian context, some lawyers for groups should be subject to 
special communication and disclosure requirements when representing 
clients that expect and, indeed, reasonably need greater loyalty.314 
C.  Challenging the Primacy of Professional Identity over 
Nonprofessional Identity 
Nonaccountability explains the primacy of professional identity over 
nonprofessional identity pursuant to the Standard Conception.  Because 
clients, and clients alone, exercise authority over setting the objectives of 
the attorney-client relationship, and lawyers are reduced to mere 
mouthpieces on behalf of clients, lawyers are implicitly encouraged to 
practice law qua lawyers with a universal professional identity divorced 
from any aspects of their personal identity.  Exactly because lawyers are 
nonaccountable to the objectives pursued by their clients, their personal 
identities, values, and commitments are irrelevant to their practice of law 
and their professional identity. 
Leading scholars of the profession have challenged such “bleached-out 
professionalism” and have explored the complex and nuanced ways in 
which personal identity does and should help inform and shape a lawyer’s 
professional identity.315  Our analysis—in particular our questioning of 
nonaccountability as the only and obvious baseline of lawyering—joins 
such calls for further exploration of the interplay of professional and 
personal identity and cautions against unreflectively accepting the 
dominance of the former over the latter. 
Of course, some lawyers may choose to accept the primacy of law and its 
conception of universal professional identity over aspects of their personal 
identity.  For example, some Jewish lawyers practicing in the mid-twentieth 
century chose professional identity as lawyers as a means toward 
assimilation and becoming American.316  For these lawyers, the answer to 
the question “what does it mean to be a Jewish lawyer” exemplifies the 
supremacy of law over their ethnoreligious identity:  to be a lawyer first, 
then Jewish, in the sense that one’s ethnoreligious identity is secondary to 
one’s professional identity.  The same prioritization of professional identity 
over personal identity, at least in the workplace, resounds with many other 
lawyers as well.317 
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Yet there is nothing inherently obvious about such a choice.  Others may 
legitimately view their professional identity as secondary to their personal 
identity.  Law can certainly be a useful tool, but it is not inherently 
constitutive of lawyers qua lawyers or of lawyers qua people.  The late 
Navajo lawyer and judge Claudeen Bates Arthur wrote, “[M]y clan 
relationships tell me who I really am.”318  These relationships, and the 
cultural identity that they reflect, create some tension between personal and 
professional identities.  As she stated, “The dilemma is there:  outside 
external thinking and philosophy and internal tribal identity.”319  In her 
view, the way to reconcile this tension is to distinguish between internal and 
external matters:   
[W]e must deal with internal matters from the standpoint of rules and law 
set forth by the Holy People.  We must deal with external forces from the 
standpoint of their rules and laws, perhaps that is the Uniform 
Commercial Code, contracts, or other such subjects.  Tribal lawyers 
should make those distinctions and remember to preserve and protect that 
which is internal if cultural sovereignty is to survive.320 
In a similar vein, G. William Rice, a prominent professor, tribal attorney, 
and former elected leader of the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee 
Indians, has explained that, from his perspective, “it makes no sense to 
adopt power, rank, and wealth as the measure of individual honor and 
attainment, and disregard our traditional standards of fairness, generosity, 
humble attitudes, and respectable actions in life.”321  Indeed, tribal 
attorneys and Indian societies have access to “an alternative view of society, 
social processes, and human kind’s place on this earth.”322  From this 
perspective, Rice proposes that “as Tribal Attorneys, then, we must protect 
and, where necessary, begin the process of recovering, our own tribal 
identities, governmental structures, social control methodologies, and 
dispute resolution systems.”323 
While drawing on Native religion and culture for strength in legal 
practice, however, Pawnee attorney Walter Echo-Hawk articulates a clear 
line between the attorney and the client.  As he explains: 
As an attorney you’re an advocate for other people.  The best attorneys 
are the ones that try to maintain a professional outlook . . .  It can be very 
trying sometimes.  You always have to maintain your professional duties.  
It’s not about you, it’s about your client.  Try to be grounded in your own 
culture and spirituality that you have.  That will give you strength.324 
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Our point, to be clear, is not that there is something wrong with choosing 
to embrace one’s professional identity as a lawyer as a constitutive or even 
dominant aspect of one’s identity.  Rather, it is that for many lawyers who 
are group members, including some Native Americans and other minorities, 
to accept law as completely defining one’s professional role is to deny the 
past and to concede alternative conceptions of the future.  It is also to ignore 
the discriminatory treatment that Native American lawyers may receive at 
the hands of others who will attribute, often incorrectly, stereotypes and 
assumptions about the confluence of their personal and professional 
identities.325 
Moreover, the traditional Standard Conception discourse does not 
acknowledge a space for group/tribal identity as a meaningful aspect of 
one’s professional identity.  As we have seen, the counterweight for the 
professional identity is conceptualized as various “personal” aspects of 
one’s identity, such that if one, as an individual lawyer, chooses to highlight 
her identity as a Native American, she is welcome to do so.  But developing 
one’s identity as a group member is simply not part of a discourse in an 
environment that enshrines individualism as its core value. 
Yet such an exclusion of group identity as a meaningful component of 
one’s professional identity is neither intuitive nor inevitable.  Professor 
Strickland argues: 
[One] must be both an Indian and a lawyer.  By this, I do not mean that 
every Indian must serve only Indian clients or Indian cases or even that 
lawyers who are Indians should not choose to serve clients exclusively in 
a non-Indian world.  But I personally think the rewards are greatest for the 
Indian lawyer who wants to direct himself toward legal problems for the 
Indian people.326 
Robert A. Williams, Jr.,327 and Stacy L. Leeds,328 both prominent law 
professors and tribal members, have written evocatively about the American 
Indian community’s expectations for them to apply their legal training and 
professional resources to problems in tribal communities.  These 
expectations did not come as a huge surprise, as Williams tells it, because  
I was raised in a traditional Indian home, which meant I was raised to 
think independently and to act for others. . . .  [M]y upbringing meant that 
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I had to endure probing questions at the family dinner table, asked by my 
elders, like, “Boy, what have you done for your people today?”329  
He faced the same kinds of expectations when he became a law professor at 
the University of Arizona and local tribes began calling for legal 
assistance.330  Leeds received similar inquiries from tribes in Oklahoma and 
Kansas.  Yet both Williams and Leeds were instructed by senior law school 
colleagues, and institutional pressures more generally, that spending 
substantial time on “service” would detract from the pursuit of legal 
scholarship and tenure.  Nevertheless, as Leeds tells it, she chose to “say 
yes”—in her case by serving as a judge on many tribal courts—because 
“saying no to an American Indian community in need could leave that 
community without adequate legal assistance.”331  Williams, too, ultimately 
chose to infuse his professional practice with cultural morality, creating an 
indigenous human rights clinic that would train students by representing 
tribal clients.332 
Group morality may inhere not only in career choices but also in 
lawyering strategies.  Some of the most difficult ethical cases in Indian 
Country pit tribal sovereignty against individual civil rights.333  In their 
most extreme formulation, these cases juxtapose tribal survival with 
individual liberties.  But across Indian Country advocates have begun to 
consider that perhaps the characterization and treatment of these cases in 
such extreme, adversarial terms is itself a leftover of the colonial process 
that would be handled better by revitalizing distinctly tribal forms of 
dispute resolution that reconcile collective and individual rights.  Wenona 
Singel—a prominent law professor and tribal court judge, as well as a 
citizen of the Little Traverse Bay Band of Odawa Indians—has, for 
example, advocated the development of an intertribal human rights tribunal 
that would rely on tribal norms and processes to address tribal and 
individual concerns.334  Professor Singel courageously acknowledges that 
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tribes can be human rights violators—a point that is often difficult for tribal 
advocates and scholars to accept—but also have the capacity to provide 
their citizens with venues for redress.335 
These examples show how several American Indian lawyers have 
embraced the morality of the community in which they are members—a 
morality that expects individuals with particular resources to contribute 
them for the good of the group—managing to successfully navigate 
professional pressures to the contrary.  Such a professional group-identity 
may not appeal to all lawyers representing groups, or even to all American 
Indians representing tribes.  But it is an important alternative to the 
Standard Conception, foreclosed by the dominant ideology and the Rules 
that implement it.  Scholars of the legal profession have cautioned about the 
perils of making universal assumptions about clients, lawyers, and their 
relationships and have compellingly advocated for a careful study of the 
profession in context.336  Yet navigating the space between universalism 
and contextual analysis is often a challenging task.  In particular, while 
attention to context, such as studying the experiences of tribal lawyers, is 
imperative, there is at the same time a legitimate concern and therefore a 
reluctance to associate special skill sets or experiences with particular 
groups.  Such categorization smacks of essentialism or even discriminatory 
bias, especially when generalizations are made about political, racial, or 
ethnic minorities.  And so it becomes difficult and highly charged to discuss 
the role of personal and group identity in the professional lives of tribal 
lawyers. 
In American Indian communities, as well as other groups, identity 
questions are front and center, and these questions affect the professional 
lives of tribal lawyers.  In particular, tribal members are usually very aware 
of an individual’s relationship to the community, whether he or she is a 
relative, enrolled tribal member, or otherwise recognized by the community 
as an Indian—and the lawyer’s status in this regard will almost certainly be 
a factor in the reception he or she receives by the community.  As described 
above, a lawyer’s membership in the community may help him or her 
access and imbue the community’s values in practice.  On the other hand, 
the lawyer’s membership in an Indian tribe could also create conflicts of 
interest337 where, for example, the lawyer/member has a direct financial, 
political, or other stake in the outcome of a matter wherein the tribe is a 
party.  We suggest, therefore, that the question of identity—professional, 
personal, and group—goes to the tribal lawyer’s professional effectiveness 
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in a way that challenges the traditional divide between role morality and 
common morality/identity. 
In typically compelling fashion, Norm Spaulding argues that lawyers 
should not too closely identify with their clients.  A lawyer’s role, asserts 
Spaulding, “is grounded in a logic of service, not identification,”338 
pursuant to which lawyers ought to diligently represent clients “irrespective 
of any personal, moral, or ideological affinity between them.”339  Moreover, 
“[i]dentification, by contrast, turns the role into an object of self-realization 
for the lawyer.  Intense identification between lawyer and client—what I 
call ‘thick professional identity’—is typically a self-interested perversion of 
the service norm.”340  Spaulding’s call for lawyers to reject thick 
professional identity is certainly plausible and persuasive in some contexts, 
especially in the individualistic sphere of criminal defense.341  Indeed, we 
are not arguing that, to use Spaulding’s terminology, thick professional 
identity is required of all tribal or group lawyers, or even that it is superior 
to or more desirable than thin professional identity.  We do, however, 
believe that for some group lawyers, some of the time, group identity is 
relevant and plays a role in the construction of their professional identity 
and representation of clients.  By denying that role and the space for 
exploring the relevance of thick (or at least thicker) professional identity, 
the Standard Conception does a disservice to both group clients and their 
lawyers. 
D.  Some Models from Indian Country 
We have argued that the stories of tribal lawyers reveal the need for 
diverse visions and professional ideologies to emerge alongside the 
dominant ideology of the Standard Conception.  To some extent, tribes and 
American Indian law organizations have begun to make space for these 
alternative conceptions.  Several national and tribal bar associations, tribal 
legislatures, and other bodies have expressed concepts of client 
empowerment, attorney accountability, and tribal identity in their own 
statements of professional responsibility. 
The National Native American Bar Association (NNABA), for example, 
states that its collective mission is “Representing Indian Nations not just 
Indian Lawyers.”342  In this regard the NNABA’s purpose is about more 
than support for lawyers who happen to be American Indian and is also 
about more that promoting cross-cultural awareness.  Instead, the NNABA 
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articulates:  “[M]ost of our lawyers are both U.S. citizens and citizens of 
their respective Tribal nations.  Our members, therefore, also share the 
communal responsibility, either directly or indirectly, of protecting the 
governmental sovereignty of the more than 560 independent Native 
American Tribal governments in the United States.”343  This is a clear 
recognition and embrace of the relationship between the identity of the 
lawyer-members and a standard of professional conduct.344  The NNABA 
mission is not without complexity, given that it does not define the concept 
of “protecting governmental sovereignty” nor does it articulate how to 
weigh the interests of individual Indians or other parties against tribal 
governments.  Yet, most American Indian lawyers will understand this 
statement as reflecting a relatively clear and commonly shared sense of 
professional obligation to advance tribal self-determination against other 
interests.  As a general matter, the NNABA statements are important 
because, while they are not binding or enforceable, they set expectations for 
Indian lawyers wherever they practice and, in this regard, are arguably 
broader and more unifying than the reservation-based codes described 
below. 
In another example, the National Tribal Judicial Center at the National 
Judicial College promulgated a “Sample Tribal Code of Judicial Conduct” 
in 2007.345  The project aims to equip tribal courts with tools that they need 
to foster a sense of institutional dignity and legitimacy, with external and 
internal constituents.  These concerns are particularly acute with the 
passage of the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, restoring a certain 
measure of tribal court authority over criminal matters,346 and the 
increasing presence of business interests in Indian Country.347  As one 
attorney notes: 
Private businesses are very afraid of the notion of a tribal court.  Tribes 
have recognized that impression and have been trying to say, ‘This is a 
legitimate system . . . .  The adoption of the model codes in wide usage, 
which people understand inside and outside the tribal context, would be 
helpful in that regard.’348 
For some of these reasons, perhaps, the Sample Tribal Code incorporates 
much of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. 
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Notwithstanding this substantial nod to uniformity, however, the drafters 
of the Sample Tribal Code contemplated certain considerations specific to 
tribal courts, including the fact that some tribal courts recognize 
nonattorney judges, use nonadversarial peacemaking techniques, or permit 
judges to receive culturally sanctioned gifts.349  Another key issue was 
“whether to prohibit ex parte communications with judges . . . in close-knit 
Indian communities where judges are looked to as community pillars in the 
broader sense.”350  In the words of seasoned tribal court judge B.J. Jones, 
“The tribal judge is more than an arbitrator of disputes.  You’ve got to be 
actively involved in the community.”351  To make room for these norms 
and values, the Tribal Sample Code was “designed to encourage tribal 
courts to tweak it as much as they want.”352 
As the Sample Tribal Code foreshadows, tribes have begun to articulate 
their own professional norms, though various vehicles including tribal 
legislative codes, tribal constitutions, tribal bar associations, and even tribal 
attorney job descriptions.  As we have noted above, this sovereign power to 
enact regulation within the tribal territory is one of the attributes that 
differentiates Indian tribes from most other groups in the United States.  For 
example, the Navajo Nation, through its legislative code, prohibits the 
unauthorized practice of law on the reservation.353  To become eligible to 
practice in the Navajo Nation, an individual must become a member of the 
Navajo Nation Bar Association,354 with admission ultimately overseen by 
the Navajo Nation Supreme Court.355  Applicants must take the Navajo Bar 
Exam, which tests on general subjects (torts, contracts, domestic relations, 
and so on) and on Navajo law (e.g., Navajo children’s law, tribal 
jurisdiction, and peacemaking).  The Navajo Bar Association requires a 
“prescribed course in Navajo law, culture, traditions and history” prior to 
sitting for the bar.356  The bar association’s website explains key legal terms 
in the Navajo language such as “naalyeeh,” a concept that is closely related 
to restitution and takes into account harmony, clan relationships, and hard 
feelings among people—and “ke” or a concept of equality, reciprocity, 
respect that facilitates consensual solutions.357  Not unlike certain U.S. 
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states (e.g., New Hampshire and California), the Navajo Nation allows 
individuals who have not graduated from law school to take the bar358—but 
at the Navajo Nation, this track is reserved for members of any federally 
recognized tribe who have completed an undergraduate, paralegal, or other 
approved educational program.359  In these many respects, the Navajo 
Nation, through its legislative code and bar association, appears to address 
issues of ethics, culture competency, and individual Indian empowerment 
that have diminished representation of tribal clients in the past.  Such an 
approach could be—and often is—modeled by other tribes with specific 
crafting to their own norms, values, and processes.360 
Finally, we note that several tribes have begun to provide legal services 
for individual tribal members.  As we noted above, tribal attorneys often 
receive legal inquiries from individual tribal members, but under an entity-
based approach to representation, the tribal attorney is bound to decline, 
citing her singular duty to the tribe as client.  That response is not 
particularly satisfying in the many tribal communities where attorneys and 
the money to pay for them may be in short supply, and where tribal 
members see the tribal attorney’s office as a source of much-needed 
professional information.  The Little Traverse Bay Band of Odawa Indians 
recently passed legislation creating an “Office of Citizens Legal 
Assistance” in the Legal Department of the Tribe.361  The Office may assist 
tribal citizens with drafting and advice on matters such as estate planning, 
real estate, landlord-tenant issues, divorce, and guardianships.362  The 
Office cannot, however, appear in tribal court or to assist in matters wherein 
the tribe is involved.363  In an analogous mode, the Office of the 
Reservation Attorney (ORA) of the Tulalip Tribes of Washington may 
“provide information, referral and legal assistance to Tulalip tribal members 
on minor matters where the assistance does not present an apparent conflict 
with the ORA’s primary duty to provide legal consel to the Tulalip 
Tribes.”364 While traditional legal services, operated independently of 
tribes, have provided similar assistance,365 these new programs suggest an 
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understanding of a more capacious role for the tribal attorney’s office in 
meeting the needs of citizens, albeit with careful attention to potential 
conflicts. 
In our view, these examples begin to reflect the complex roles of lawyers 
for both groups and individuals.  The Sample Tribal Code, albeit geared 
toward judges, offers a helpful model for how the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, designed for the classic model of individual lawyering, might be 
used in group settings.  It sets a baseline of professional expectations, 
reflecting consensus on minimum standards for lawyers across the country, 
but leaves space for each tribe to express its own cultural norms and 
relationships, and to reflect its own tribal history and political structures.  
The NNABA Mission, in turn, suggests that bar associations and other 
groups of professionals can also take a role in articulating standards and 
expectations of attorney conduct that are more capacious and more 
responsive to particular groups.  And tribal codes and bar associations 
increasingly recognize cultural competency, Indian empowerment, and the 
concerns of individual tribal members as within the considerations that 
attorneys for tribes should take into account, where possible. 
We consider all of these examples important alternatives, modifications, 
and supplements to the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct with 
their slim content on group lawyering.  Notably, most of these tribal-
specific statements of ethics are moderate variations on the Rules; they do 
not, for example, tend to discount the role of attorneys, adversarial 
proceedings, or U.S. law altogether.  And they often acknowledge the utility 
of having a common baseline that provides some consistency across 
representation of Indian tribes.  This approach is, like much legal reform 
occurring in Indian Country,366 a reasonable and manageable step toward 
decolonizing the relationship between tribes and their lawyers.  It gives 
tribes and their lawyers a starting point for their common involvement in 
tribal, state, and federal legal systems—a set of minimum expectations that 
lawyers for tribes have often failed to meet in the past—while articulating 
and giving voice to Indian cultural and political norms where they depart 
from the mainstream.  Beyond these examples, tribal governments, 
professional associations and organizations, along with other groups, will 
surely continue to develop additional alternatives and complements to the 
Rules. 
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CONCLUSION 
As lawyers and clients evaluate how best to use the power of the law and 
legal profession, there is perhaps something to be learned from the 
experience of tribal lawyers.  In this vein, Rennard Strickland once retold 
the following story: 
There was an Osage legend or prophecy which said that the white man 
would bring something with him that was of great value but that he would 
not know how to use it and that the Indian would take it and add to it and 
change it and that it would then be good and true and pure.  Some say that 
this was Christianity and that when the Indian joined peyote with this new 
Christian religion that the prophecy was fulfilled.  I think the same may 
be true of the statute and case law which the white man brought.  Our 
challenge is to take that law and add to it and change it so that law can be 
good and true and pure not only for Indian people but for all people.367 
The Standard Conception of lawyering, and the Rules of Professional 
Conduct that implement it, celebrate individualism, client autonomy, and 
lawyers’ role morality.  There is certainly room for such traditional 
representation of tribes and other groups under this dominant model of law 
practice, and tribal lawyers can also learn much from models of corporate, 
government, cause, and civil rights lawyering, each of which may be 
relevant to the particular legal challenges that they face.  But at the end of 
the day, tribes are not necessarily like the other corporations, governments, 
causes, or minorities within the American legal landscape.  They are Indian 
tribes, each with a particular history and contemporary reality that impacts 
their representation by lawyers.  A theory of law practice and rules of 
professional conduct that build on it must acknowledge the range and 
diversity of clients, lawyers, and the relationships they form, and encourage 
the development of professional ideologies that reflect the commitments 
and values of lawyers for groups. 
In this Article, we demonstrate that in some instances, the Standard 
Conception’s norms of zealous advocacy, nonaccountability, and role 
morality, as well as specific Rules of Professional Conduct, ill fit and 
poorly guide the practice of tribal lawyers.  Indeed, effective representation 
rather than zealous advocacy, client empowerment rather than lawyer 
nonaccountability, and tribal identity may be relevant factors in the 
relationship between lawyers and tribes.  We argue that the experience of 
tribal lawyers compellingly challenges the dominant ideology and the 
Rules, and suggests not only the need to rethink and reimagine some 
aspects of the regulatory apparatus but also the professional ideology that 
legitimizes it.368  With the experience of legal oppression, and the ongoing 
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commitment to community, tribes suggest additional conceptions of law 
and means of practicing it.  The alternative conceptions described in this 
Article reflect tribes’ particular experiences with conquest and colonization, 
their status as political sovereigns, and the current movement of tribal self-
determination in governance, culture, and socioeconomics.  More broadly, 
however, the representation of tribes suggests that all groups and even 
individuals may benefit from the emergence of alternative models of legal 
practice that make room for the values, identities, and experiences of groups 
and their lawyers. 
